特朗普第二任期后，俄乌冲突的解决似乎按下了加速键。美欧战略脱钩进入倒计时？俄美何时能达成共识？在最终的和平协议中，俄罗斯的红线是什么？哪些是俄罗斯无法放弃的核心利益？

俄罗斯科学院欧洲研究所（IE RAS）所长阿列克谢·葛罗米柯在三亚接受北京对话专访时表示，俄乌冲突根源在于北约东扩，需先就停战框架达成共识，而不宜仓促停火。他强调，欧洲单方面向乌克兰派遣维和部队会被视为军事打击目标。任何维和安排都应得到联合国安理会授权。

葛罗米柯的爷爷是前苏联最高苏维埃主席团主席、任期最长的外交部长安德烈·葛罗米柯。葛罗米柯表示，爷爷最引以为傲的外交成就就是促成联合国的诞生。尽管当下有许多批评联合国的声音，但联合国仍然是国际体系重要支柱与解决国际分歧的场所，二战后建立的雅尔塔-波茨坦体系仍在造福后人。

阿列克谢·葛罗米柯在三亚接受北京对话专访 （图源：北京对话）

韩桦：作为欧洲问题专家，当您听到J.D.万斯在慕尼黑安全会议上的演讲时，您的第一反应是什么？

阿列克谢·葛罗米柯：我并不感到震惊，这也不出乎我的意料。

韩桦：但在场的每个人都感到震惊。

阿列克谢·葛罗米柯：我认为这只是反映那些人的无知。事实上，这一局面早已有迹可循，不仅仅是从去年11月特朗普胜选开始，而是早在他2016年至2017年首次当选并开始执政的四年间，许多人就已经感到惊讶、沮丧或震惊，这在当时是可以理解的。

在我看来，欧洲政治精英的问题在于，他们跟不上国际体系和世界政治变化的节奏。对许多俄罗斯专家而言，甚至对中国和其他国家的许多专家而言，预测特朗普及其团队的行动并不困难。这不仅是特朗普个人或性格因素决定的，这是“特朗普主义”的体现——它是一股强大的政治潮流，不仅影响着美国，也影响着欧洲。因此，欧洲政治精英在特朗普的“第二次到来”前准备不足，未能预料慕尼黑安全会议上会发生什么，这本身就是一些政客以及为他们提供咨询的智库和专家的问题。

当然，万斯用了极其冷酷的表达方式，他强调欧洲政治精英面临的最大威胁并非来自外部，而是来自内部。这一表述尖锐地凸显了当下美国与欧洲战略思维的分歧。

在俄罗斯，我们早就预见到，在特朗普2.0时代，美欧之间将发生所谓的“战略脱钩”；现在，这正成为现实。所以，对我个人以及我们国家的其他专家来说，这并不令人惊讶，这是我们在战略上早已预见的趋势。它可能会以不同的具体方式发生，但最终，事态仍然按照其固有逻辑发展。这正是“特朗普主义”的本质。

美国副总统万斯在本届慕尼黑安全会议上发表讲话，大肆批评欧洲（图源：视觉中国）

韩桦：所以您认为这种变化是不可避免的，是一种根本性的变化，并且会对传统的跨大西洋关系产生巨大影响。那么，这又将如何影响俄欧关系呢？

阿列克谢·葛罗米柯：俄罗斯与欧洲的关系并不是孤立存在的，而是深深嵌入世界政治之中，它受全球局势的影响。至少有两个外部因素对俄欧关系的动态起着重要作用：美欧关系和中欧关系。

前总统拜登执政期间，美国奉行“双重遏制”（dual containment）战略，针对俄罗斯和中国。与此同时，华盛顿推行“双重脱钩”（double decoupling）政策：一方面削弱美欧联系，另一方面推动欧盟与俄罗斯脱钩。

未来几十年，美国的重点是与中国的竞争。从美国的所有战略文件来看，中国被美国视为21世纪的系统性挑战，而俄罗斯则被贴上了“眼前的威胁”标签。这一战略思路也促使美国推动美欧脱钩，以及迫使欧盟与俄罗斯切断经济联系的政策。华盛顿在拜登执政时期将这一目标作为最优先事项之一。

目前，我认为俄罗斯愿意先与美国稳定关系，然后再与那些能认清现实的欧洲国家实现关系正常化。俄罗斯从未主动发起过任何形式的制裁或限制，每一次都只是对外部施压做出的回应。但俄罗斯是一个全球性大国，同时是联合国安理会常任理事国。因此，俄罗斯有必要在自身周边地区保持稳定和务实的外交关系，即使不一定是友好的关系。未来几年，俄罗斯会努力与美国和一些欧洲国家建立务实的外交关系。

与此同时，俄罗斯对当前和未来可预见的全球地缘政治格局有着清晰的判断，这就是“向东转”战略。俄罗斯的战略重点将放在与中国、印度、亚洲其他主要国家，以及与非洲和拉美的新兴大国建立更紧密的战略伙伴关系。

在当前局势下，俄罗斯将对欧外交政策放在次要地位。俄欧关系的发展并不取决于俄罗斯的意愿或它能够向欧方提供什么。长期以来，欧洲各国尤其是德国，都因与俄罗斯建立全面的经济关系而受益匪浅。现在，俄欧关系能否恢复，完全取决于欧洲执政精英是否能做出务实和理性的决策。

韩桦：我认为，您提到的欧亚安全架构其实也是一个信号，可以被视为俄罗斯正在认真且战略性地转向东方。但与此同时，俄罗斯依然是全球大国，而不仅仅是地区大国，因此需要维持与欧洲的稳定关系。这首先取决于俄罗斯与美国关系的稳定，而衡量美俄关系是否稳定的一个关键因素，就是双方能否坐下来直接谈判结束战争。那么，在可预见的未来，您认为这种谈判能否达成？

阿列克谢·葛罗米柯：目前确实出现了一个新的机会窗口。俄罗斯一直坚定地寻求通过外交途径解决问题并展开谈判。在过去三年中，曾有过多次可能实现外交突破的关键节点，尤其是在2022年春天，当时俄罗斯的代表、外交官和政治人物曾与乌克兰方面进行谈判，双方一度接近达成协议，但最终被美国和英国所破坏。

自那时起，西方就寻求俄罗斯的“战略性失败”；然而事实证明，这并非真正的战略，而是一种一厢情愿的幻想，甚至可以说是美国（更不用说欧盟）在乌克兰危机中犯下的战略性错误。试图让俄罗斯这样一个核大国在乌克兰问题上遭受战略性失败，本身就是极其危险的幻想。对莫斯科而言，在乌克兰危机中失败就意味着真正的战略失败。

2022年3月，俄乌在土耳其开展谈判（图源：安纳多卢通讯社）

如今，美国国内的政治思维似乎开始出现了一些明显的变化。他们意识到，继续在一场原本就是空中楼阁的事情上浪费数千亿美元，既毫无意义，又极端危险。特朗普希望把精力集中在美国国内事务上，恢复美国的经济实力。他不愿意再深陷于外国军事行动或代理人战争之中，因为这对美国来说不仅是沉重的负担，而且极有可能导致与其他核大国的直接军事冲突。

大国之间应当像历史上多次所做的那样，找到维护国家利益和安全的平衡点。乌克兰危机不仅仅是俄罗斯与乌克兰之间的双边危机，虽然两国之间确实存在一定的矛盾，但危机的根源实际上在于苏联解体后俄罗斯与北约关系的发展，特别是在国家安全领域的冲突。

韩桦：当俄罗斯和美国进入谈判阶段时，在您看来有哪些是必须做到，哪些是绝不能触及的事情？比如，西欧领导人提议冻结俄罗斯3000亿美元资产用于战后重建，这是否是俄方无法接受的红线？还有哪些核心利益是俄罗斯绝对不会让步的？哪些方面是可以谈判和妥协的？

阿列克谢·葛罗米柯：首先，俄罗斯非常坚定地认为，北约扩张是对我们国家安全的主要威胁。北约不是一个非政府组织，而是一个军事联盟，而且它的官方文件中明确把俄罗斯定义为主要威胁和主要对手。北约的扩张不仅仅是外交表态，而是具体的军事现实，涉及军事基础设施的建设、军事部队的部署，而这一切正在逐步逼近俄罗斯的边界，甚至接近俄罗斯的军事指挥和政治决策中心。

西方集体在乌克兰对俄罗斯发动的代理人战争，对俄罗斯而言就是一场“古巴导弹危机2.0”，这是俄罗斯绝对不会妥协的底线。俄罗斯当然愿意谈判，但如果未来的欧洲安全体系仍然建立在“俄罗斯是威胁”的概念上，并且继续推动西欧和中欧的军事化，那么这绝不会是俄罗斯能够接受的解决方案。

因此，未来的和平解决方案将经历复杂而全面的外交谈判，最终希望能达成一项和平协议，但这将涉及多个谈判轨道。第一条轨道是美俄双边谈判，这是当前莫斯科与华盛顿正在推进的内容。正因为如此，欧洲并未被纳入谈判桌，也没有人认为欧洲应该出现在谈判中。目前，美俄之间的谈判主要集中在恢复两国外交机构的正常运作，即恢复美国驻莫斯科大使馆和俄罗斯驻华盛顿大使馆的正常职能。如果在这一点上取得实质性进展，接下来才会更容易进入乌克兰危机的政治解决。

俄罗斯的立场十分明确：外交解决不能操之过急。尤其是当问题极其复杂且涉及多方利益时，必须采取循序渐进的方式解决。如果一切进展顺利，今年或许可以看到美俄关系的某种正常化，以及乌克兰危机解决进程的一些进展，但不会有奇迹发生，不会有魔法般的解决方案。这需要时间，需要大量努力。同时，我们必须意识到，无论是在欧洲、美国，还是乌克兰内部，都会有大量政治势力试图破坏和平进程。

这就是为什么中国应当发挥重要作用。中国大胆提出了和平倡议，并派遣高级外交官前往各国斡旋。我相信，全面解决乌克兰危机将离不开中国的积极参与。

韩桦：非常感谢您提到中国在过去三年所做出的努力，我们的欧亚事务特别代表李辉大使几乎走遍了世界各地，推动解决这场危机，提出中国的方案和贡献。但特朗普是一位商人，他没有太多耐心。

那么，我们该如何管理或者帮助特朗普控制节奏呢？我非常赞同您所提到的通过逐步恢复外交关系来推进和平谈判，也同意应该把各种谈判条件放到桌面上进行讨论。但问题是，特朗普希望尽快解决问题。在您看来，是否应该先达成停火，然后再进行逐步的政治谈判？

2023年5月，中国政府欧亚事务特别代表李辉会见时任乌克兰外交部长库列巴（图源：外交部网站）

阿列克谢·葛罗米柯：问题在于，单纯的停火本身并不是解决方案，停火必须放在一个完整的框架之内。如果停火是和平解决方案的一部分，那么这是可以考虑的。但如果只是单方面宣布停火，而没有明确的后续安排，那么这样的停火很可能会迅速破裂。

在真正谈论停火之前，俄罗斯和美国必须进行深度磋商，这应该是闭门会谈，在合适的时候，也可以引入中国和其他曾在过去几年提出和平倡议的国家。

如果确实有政治意愿，愿意将停火作为和平解决的第一步，并且确保这一进程符合俄罗斯的国家利益，那么停火是可行的。但如果只是仓促宣布停火，而没有明确的未来规划，没有后续的政治路线图，那么这样的停火毫无意义，甚至可能导致局势变得更糟糕。

韩桦：您是否接受任何欧洲军事力量作为乌克兰境内的核心维和部队？

阿列克谢·葛罗米柯：俄罗斯介入此次危机的根本原因，最主要的便是北约东扩、俄方要求乌克兰军事中立，以及人道主义问题，尤其是乌克兰境内数百万俄语居民的未来。数百万乌克兰人已逃往俄罗斯，经历了多次难民潮。

这一切并非始于2022年，而是可以追溯到2014年。当时基辅发生政变，新上台的政府派遣正规军进攻乌克兰东部。随后，在2015年1月，基辅方面又第二次发动军事行动。因此，乌克兰的战事经历了多个阶段。最初，这是乌克兰国内的内战，基辅政府动用了正规军；而自2022年起，俄罗斯开始在这一局势中深度介入。

要解决这个问题，我们必须充分考虑其发生的深层原因。这其中并非只有一颗地雷需要拆除，而是许多问题交织在一起。俄乌必然迟早会达成某种停火协议，但有不同类型的停火协议：有的可以推动问题的真正解决，有的只是暂时的战争间歇。俄罗斯希望达成的停火协议必须是迈向真正解决方案的第一步。

俄罗斯不会接受任何未经其同意的外国军队部署在乌克兰。如果法国或英国的军队以维和部队的名义进入乌克兰，却没有获得正式授权，对俄罗斯而言，他们将被视为合法的军事打击目标。在现实中，唯一可能获得所有大国认可的合法授权，只有联合国的维和授权，并且该授权必须得到联合国安理会批准。我承认，这将是艰难的外交博弈，但解决如此复杂的危机怎么可能是件轻而易举的事情呢？理论上，未来的某个时候，我们可能会看到来自不同国家的军队部署在乌克兰，但前提必须是有明确的授权。

3月2日，十余个欧洲和欧盟国家，以及乌克兰和加拿大的领导人在英国伦敦举行峰会，会上提出派欧洲部队在乌克兰维和（图源：英国首相府 新华社发）

韩桦：我完全同意您的观点。世界上唯一的正式维和部队就是联合国维和部队。您的表态非常明确，也非常有力。中国是联合国维和行动的主要贡献者，不仅在人员派遣方面投入巨大，在财政支持上也是贡献最大的国家之一。因此，我认为未来在联合国安理会的决策以及维和授权方面，中国完全可以发挥关键作用。

您成长于一个科学家与外交官的家庭，这对您的职业生涯和世界观产生了怎样的影响？我们应当从冷战历史中吸取哪些教训？在去世前，您的祖父安德烈·葛罗米柯曾高度评价当时正在进行的改革。能否与我们分享当时的情况？如今，许多人拿特朗普与戈尔巴乔夫进行比较，您如何看待这种比较？

阿列克谢·葛罗米柯：事实上，我一直追随我爷爷安德烈·葛罗米柯和我父亲阿纳托利·葛罗米柯的足迹。安德烈·葛罗米柯最初是作为科学家开始他的职业生涯的。1936年，他在经济学领域获得博士学位，研究方向是美国经济。直到1939年，他才被邀请加入苏联外交部，开始从事外交工作。但即便如此，他仍然在科学研究领域保持活跃。1957年，他被任命为苏联外交部长，但就在此一年前，他刚完成了自己的博士论文。

当他在1952-1953年担任苏联驻伦敦大使时，他仍然在收集研究材料，为自己的博士论文做准备。即使在1957年成为苏联外交部长之后，他依然撰写了大量的学术文章和书籍。因此，他既是外交官，也是学者。他始终认为，外交不仅仅是一项职业，也不仅仅是一种公务，而是一门艺术。对他而言，外交的艺术必须建立在科学的基础之上。这种“外交、艺术、科学”三者结合的理念，贯穿了他的一生。

他坚信和平共处的概念。这正是为什么，在他的外交推动下，苏联与美国以及西方其他主要国家在20世纪60年代和70年代，逐步实现了高度的外交互动，即我们所说的缓和政策。在此期间，苏联与美国签署了一系列重要的双边与国际条约，例如：《不扩散核武器条约》、《第一次削减战略武器条约》、《第二次削减战略武器条约》、《反弹道导弹条约》（但遗憾的是，美国在2002年单方面退出了该条约）。

1972年，葛罗米柯和尼克松正式确立《反导条约》生效 （图源：哈佛大学）

他一生致力于构建全球战略稳定的架构，推动苏美军事和政治实现均势，并用外交手段降低全球军事风险。在实现这些目标的过程中，苏联外交政策采用了多种手段，但其核心并不是强行施压，而是寻求达成各方都能接受的公平协议。在某些情况下，需要妥协；在其他情况下，需要突破常规思维，寻找新的解决方案。但最重要的是，每次谈判都必须向前迈进，减少军事风险，不仅仅是在欧洲，而是在全球范围内。

他始终坚信，当炮火沉寂之时，外交应该站到前台，发出最终的声音。我希望，如今的世界也能如此。当军事冲突的高峰期过去，外交应当主导局势，推动最终的和平解决方案。

韩桦：谈到和平共处，中国去年隆重庆祝了和平共处五项原则提出70周年，邀请了众多国际政要来到北京。我们刚才也简要谈到了联合国在维和方面的作用。

因此，我想再问一个关于联合国的问题，以及您对联合国未来发展的看法。您参与创立了俄罗斯“支持民主全球秩序与联合国”运动。您是如何设想民主全球秩序，它如何与世界朝着多极化方向发展的趋势相契合？另一方面，即便在俄罗斯，也有一些反对联合国的声音，认为它已经不再适应当前的全球形势。您认为联合国需要进行哪些改革？

阿列克谢·葛罗米柯：您提到的这个运动，确实是由我父亲创立的，我当时也提供了支持。后来在2019年，这一运动发展为安德烈·葛罗米柯外交政策研究协会。

关于联合国，当我们问安德烈·葛罗米柯，他认为自己最重要的成就是什么时，他通常都会将创建联合国放在首位。他曾亲身参与了敦巴顿橡树园会议，随后在1945年2月的雅尔塔会议上，战胜国达成了一系列关键决策。接着是1945年4月25日召开的旧金山会议，最终在1945年6月26日签署了《联合国宪章》。

1945年6月26日，安德烈·葛罗米柯在旧金山代表苏联签署了《联合国宪章》（图源：联合国）

联合国是雅尔塔-波茨坦国际体系的支柱之一。自上世纪90年代起，我就不断听到有人说雅尔塔-波茨坦体系已经过时，已经成为历史，尤其是在苏联解体之后。但我坚信，我们今天所处的世界，在很大程度上仍然是这一体系的延续，它也奠定了战后国际法的基础。联合国安理会仍然是国际政治的核心，这是1945年战胜国的遗产，并延续至今。

直到今天，还没有一个安理会常任理事国（更不用说非常任理事国）不高度珍视自己的安理会席位，以及其在国际事务中的地位。尽管长期以来，安理会一直是外交冲突与纷争的场所，但它仍然是一个能够反映世界秩序变化的重要平台。例如，最近就乌克兰危机问题的决议，美国、俄罗斯和中国都投了支持票，而法国和英国则选择了弃权。只有联合国这样独特的平台，才能促成如此重大的外交博弈与决策。

我认为，雅尔塔-波茨坦体系的遗产仍然是我们当下世界的一部分，它并非遥远的历史，而是一种“活着的历史”。因为直到今天，我们依然在享受1945年战胜国（包括中俄）的战略决策为我们“前人栽树，后人乘凉”。

阿列克谢·葛罗米柯参加2025·中俄三亚对话 （图源：北京对话）

以下为采访原文：

Helen: you are a renowned expert on European studies. When you first heard about JD Vance’s speech during the Munich Security Conference, what's your first impression?

Alexey Gromyko：Personally, for me, that was not a shock, that was not a surprise.

Helen：Everyone on the spot was shocked.

Alexey Gromyko：I think that this is the problem of those who were so deeply shocked, because there were many writings on the wall, not just from November last year when Trump won, but from the time when he was the president for his first 4 years, in 2016, 2017, that was quite understandable that a lot of people in the United States, a lot of people in Europe, what we call the European west, were surprised, frustrated or shocked.

But the problem of the European political elites, from my point of view, is in that they are very slow in catching up with the pace of the changes in international system and world politics. For quite a few Russian specialists, and I guess for quite a few specialists in China and in many other countries, it was not so difficult to predict what Trump, his team were going to do. This is not just a factor of Trump personally. This is not purely an effect of personality. This is not just a subjective factor. We are talking about Trumpism. This is a very powerful undercurrent, a powerful tendency in the United States and in Europe as well. So the fact that they were so poorly prepared for the second coming of Trump, for what happened during the last Munich security conference, this is a problem of certain politicians personally and those experts and think tanks who consult them. Of course, the way Vance put it was painful – he focused on the idea that the main source of threat to European political elites is from within not from outside, and of course this put in a very sharp the difference between the current strategic thinking of the United States and in Europe.

In Russia, we have been foreseeing for quite a long time that the so-called strategic decoupling between the United States and the European allies will be facilitated under Trump 2.0. Now this is what is happening. So, personally, for me and for other specialists in my country, that was not a surprise. That was something what we expected strategically. In technical terms that might have happened in different ways, but it did happen the way it did. Basically, this is what Trumpism is all about.

Helen：So you think the change is inevitable. The change is very fundamental, and will certainly have huge impact to these traditional transatlantic relations.

How will it impact the Russia-Europe relations?

Alexey Gromyko: The relations between Russia and Europe are submerged in world politics. They are not in a vacuum. It depends on what is going on across the planet. At least, there are two external factors, which played a very important role, which determines the dynamics in the relationship between Russia and Europe. This is the relationship between the United States and Europe and the relationship between China and Europe. The US under former President Biden pursued a strategy of dual containment of Russia and China. At the same time, Washington continued another strategy of double decoupling – firstly, between the United States and Europe and secondly, between Europe and Russia.

The United States for the next decades is focusing on the competition with China. China, as we know from all doctrinal documents of the US, is considered to be a systemic challenge for the US in the 21st century whereas Russia is labelled as an immediate threat. It goes hand in hand with Washington’s strategy of decoupling from its European allies and with a policy of imposing on them the decoupling of the European Union, its Single market from Russia. That was one of the top priorities for Washington under Biden.

Currently, I think that Russia firstly would be open to stabilizing and then normalizing relations with the United States, and then with those European countries, which have an ability to come to terms with the objective facts on the ground. Russia has never been the party which pioneered any kind of restrictions or sanctions. In all cases, Russia was responding to external pressure. But Russia is a global power. Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council of the UN. For Russia, it is important to have a stable, not necessarily friendly, but stable and pragmatic relations with all countries which surrounded it both in Near and Far Abroad. I'm sure that Russia will exert its efforts in the years to come to have pragmatic relations with the United States and with other European countries.

At the same time, Russia has a clear picture of the geopolitics for now and for the foreseeable future. This is based on the strategy of a “turn to the East”. The priority will be the strategic partnership with China, India, with the other leading centers of power in Asia, in Africa and Latin America. For the time being, the European vector of Russian foreign policy will be a secondary one. It will depend not so much on what Russia wants and can offer to its potential partners in Europe. For a very long time they benefited substantial, especially Germany, from comprehensive economic relations with Russia. Any prospects of normalization depend now on the pragmatic and rational thinking of ruling elites in the member states of the EU.

Helen：I think my humble opinion is that with your proposal of the European, Eurasian security architecture, this is also an indicator, correct me if I'm wrong, this is kind of an indicator of Russia is seriously and strategically turning to the East. While still maintaining a global power, not only to mention a regional power, to maintain a stabilized relationship with Europe, it needs some prerequisites of your stabilizing relationship with the United States. Another indicator of stabilizing the relationship with the United States is two parties sit together, talk directly of ending the war. So, in the foreseeable future, do you think this can be negotiated, can be done?

Alexei Gromyko：Certainly, there is a new window of opportunity now. Russia has been systemic in pursuing the way of diplomatic resolution and negotiations. In the last 3 years, there were several forks in the road, especially in Spring, 2022, when Russian representatives, diplomats, and politicians were holding talks with their Ukrainian counterparts, but negotiations were torpedoed by the US and the UK, although the two sides were very close to striking a deal. Since then, Russia was approached by the West with a “strategy of defeat”, although it has turned out not to be a strategy but a wishful thinking, not a strategy but a strategic blunder of the United States, not to mention the European Union, to try to inflict a strategic defeat to a nuclear power such as Russia. For Moscow a failure in the Ukrainian crisis would mean exactly that – a strategic defeat.

These days there are some indications that there might be a noticeable shift in political thinking in the US. They understand that to waste billions and billions of US dollars on something what initially was just castles in the air is a useless and dangerous thing to do. Trump wants to concentrate on domestic problems, on recovering the economic might of the United States. They don't want to be embroiled any more in foreign military campaigns, in proxy wars, which is a burden for them, which is a very risky thing in terms of possibility of a potential direct military clash with other nuclear powers.

Great powers should try, once again in history, to find the balance of their national interests, of narratives of their security. The Ukrainian crisis is not just a bilateral crisis between Moscow and Kiev. There were some contradictions between them but the root causes of the crisis is in the history of relations between Russia and NATO after the breakup of the Soviet Union, primarily in in the sphere of national security.

Helen：When Russia and the United States enter into negotiations, what are the “must do” or “mustn't do” things, conditions in your mind? For example, European leaders, especially western European leaders mentioned the freeze of 300 billion Russian assets to use for post war reconstruction. Is this something you cannot compromise or some other core interests that you could not compromise at all? What's in your mind? What can be compromised? What can not be compromised at all?

Alexei Gromyko：Firstly, Russia believes very strongly that the expansion of NATO is the main source of threat to our national security. NATO is not an NGO. NATO is a military bloc. And NATO has doctrinal documents. In those documents, Russia is identified as the main source of threat and their main rival. The expansion of the alliance is not just political declarations, but hardware, military infrastructure, troops up to the Russian borders, close to Russian centers of military planning and political decision making.

The proxy war of the collective West against Russia in Ukraine is a Cuban crisis 2.0 for Russia, this is something that Russia is not going to compromise on, but Russia is open to negotiations. However, if a future European security system is based on the concept that Russia is a source of threat, and that the militarization of Western and Central Europe should go on, this is not the way Russia sees how the crisis may be resolved.

We are going to have a complex and comprehensive diplomatic affair and finally, and hopefully, a peace settlement. But there will be several tracks. The first track, which Russia and the United States are pursuing now, is a bilateral track. That's why nobody expected Europe to be at the table. Moscow and Washington are talking primarily on how to restore normal functioning of diplomatic missions of the US in Moscow and of Russia in Washington. If we make a good progress there, then it will be much easier to proceed with the second track on the settlement of the Ukrainian crisis.

I think that the Russian position is very clear - it is impossible to benefit from diplomacy if you are in a hurry, especially when a problem is a very complicated and multifaceted matter, it should be dealt with step-by-step approach. If it goes well, then in the course of this year we might see some normalization in the relations between Russia and the United States and some progress in the settlement of the Ukrainian crisis, but no miracles, no magic wand; it will take time, it will take a lot of efforts. Always, we should keep in mind that there will be a lot of politicians, a lot of countries, both in Europe, in the United States, not to mention Ukraine, who are going to do their best to derail the peace process.

That's why the Chinese factor should play an important role. China was bold in putting forward its peace proposals and sending its top diplomats to different capitals. I am sure that the comprehensive settlement of this crisis will be impossible without a strong participation of China.

Helen：I appreciate you mentioning China's great efforts during the past 3 years with our special envoy, ambassador Li Hui was almost everywhere around the world to discuss how to resolve this crisis with China's efforts or China's unique contribution. But still, Trump is a businessman, and Trump is very impatient.

So how do we manage, or help him manage this pace. I really appreciate that you mentioned about normalizing the diplomatic relations step by step. People put all different conditions on the table, so we can discuss. But still, Trump wants to do it in a hurry. So in your mind, will there be a ceasefire in the first place, then we can do this kind of negotiations step by step?

Alexei Gromyko：The problem is that a ceasefire per se is not a solution. A ceasefire should be seen in a context. If there is a ceasefire within the framework of settlement, this is one thing. If there is a ceasefire without a clear idea what happens next, then such a ceasefire may break very quickly. I think that before there can be a real talk about ceasefire, there should be discussions, very serious and behind the closed doors, between Russians and Americans, and maybe later with the involvement of China, other countries, which in the past years have exerted their efforts in pushing through different peace proposals.

If there is a real political will to use the ceasefire as the first step on the way to the settlement, which takes into account the national interests of Russia, then it is doable. But to declare a ceasefire without knowing what is going to follow later, without any roadmap is a way to nowhere. In real life a poorly arranged ceasefire may lead to even worse situation in comparison with what we have now.

Helen：Do you accept any European military presence as a key peacekeeping force in Ukraine on the Ukraine soil?

Alexei Gromyko：There are some fundamental reasons why Russia was involved in this crisis. That was the expansion of NATO, the demand of military neutrality of Ukraine, and other questions, especially humanitarian ones - what will happen with millions of Russian speaking people in Ukraine. Millions of Ukrainians have fled to Russia, and there were several waves of refugees. That all started not in 2022, but in 2014. There was a coup d’etat in Kiev, and then new authorities in Kiev, who seized power, sent regular troops to the East of the country. Then they did it the second time in January 2015. So, there were several stages of warfare in Ukraine. Initially, that was a civil war within Ukraine, with Kiev, using regular army, then from 2022, Russia was deeply involved militarily in this situation.

The problem can be solved, but we should take into account a number of reasons why did it happen. This is not a single “mine” which should be diffused, there are many. Inevitably, sooner or later, a certain ceasefire will take place. But there are different types of ceasefires – the one, which can bring about the next step in resolution, and the one, which will be just a temporary pause in the warfare. Russia is interested in a ceasefire, which would be a first step to a real settlement.

Russia is not going to accept any deployment of foreign troops in Ukraine without a mandate, which it approves. If there is a deployment, for example, of French military forces or British military forces, which would portray themselves as a peacekeeping force without a mandate, for Russia these forces would be a legitimate military target. It seems that in fact the only legitimate mandate, which all major powers may accept, is a peacekeeping mandate of the United Nations and such a mandate should be approved by the Security Council. I recognize that that would be an uphill diplomatic battle. But who says that to reach a settlement of such kind of a crisis should be easy? Theoretically, it may be possible that we see military forces and deployments from different countries. But there should be very a very clear mandate.

Helen：I totally agree with you. There is only one peacekeeping force, which is called UN peacekeeping force. Your statement is a very strong, very clear one. China is a major contributor to the UN peacekeeping force and also in terms of the money we contributed. So I think maybe China can play some major role down the road of the mandate and in the UN Security Council.

You had grown up in a family of scientists and diplomats. How does that shape your career path and the general outlook? What lessons do you think we need to learn from the original Cold War? Before he passed away, your grandfather, Andrei Gromyko, had praised the then-ongoing process of Perestroika. What was it like around that time? What do you make of all the comparisons between Trump and the Gorbachev?

Alexey Gromyko：I followed, in fact, the footsteps of my grandfather Andrei Gromyko and then my father Anatoly Gromyko. Andrei Gromyko started his career as a scientist. In the 1936, he defended his PhD thesis in the economics. He specialized in the economy of the United States. Only later, in 1939, he was invited to serve in the Soviet Foreign Ministry. But later, in parallel, he continued his career as a scientist. One year before he was appointed foreign minister of the Soviet Union, which happened in 1957, he defended his doctoral thesis.

When he was Soviet ambassador in London, in 1952-1953, he was collecting research material for his doctoral thesis. And after he became the foreign minister in 1957, he kept writing many articles and several books. So, he was both a diplomat and a scientist. He was saying that diplomacy is not just a profession, not just a civil service. This is the art of diplomacy, and the art of diplomacy for him was based on science. This triangle, diplomacy, art, and science for him was a natural thing to pursue for the whole of his life.

He was the one who believed strongly in the concept of peaceful coexistence. That's why the Soviet Union and the United States, other major countries of the West in the 60s and 70s, step by step reached a high level of relationship, the so-called détente. A lot of bilateral and international treaties, for example, Non-Proliferation Treaty or SALT[8]  I, SALT II, the ABM Treaty (which the US unfortunately abandoned in 2002).

To this architecture of strategic stability, of military-political parity between the Soviet Union and the United States he dedicated his life. In order to achieve these goals, the Soviet diplomacy used different means. The main task was not to impose, but to find ways to make a deal, which would be considered by two sides or by all sides as a fair deal. Sometimes compromises, sometimes something that was not in the books and on the paper from the very start, but something that initially was a clear step forward in the terms of reducing military risks, not just in Europe, but on the global level. I think that was what he held very close to his heart - when guns are silent, diplomacy should come to the fore and say its definite word.

I hope that this is what happens this time. After the military phase of the crisis, diplomacy will say a definite word in terms of the settlement.

Helen：Speaking of this peaceful coexistence, China celebrated the 70 years of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence last year very powerfully, by inviting many world dignitaries to Beijing, we touched upon a little bit about the UN through mentioning discussion about the peacekeeping.

So one more question regarding UN and how to envision the UN. You co-founded the Russian movement “Support For a Democratic Global Order and for the United Nations”. How do you envision this democratic global order? How does this align with the idea that the world is moving in a more multipolar direction? On the other hand, there are voices even in Russia about against the UN, claiming it is no longer fit for purpose. What kind of reform do you think would be needed for the UN?

Alexey Gromyko：The movement, which you mentioned, indeed, was founded by my father with my support. Then in 2019 it evolved into the Andrei Gromyko Association of Foreign Policy Studies.

As to the United Nations, when we asked Andrei Gromyko what he considered to be his most important achievements, usually, he was putting on the first place the creation of the United Nations, the conference in Dumbarton Oaks, then the decisions which were taken in Yalta in February, 1945, then the conference in San Francisco, which was launched on the 25th of April, 1945, and then the signing of the Charter of the United Nations on the 26th of June, 1945.

The United Nations was one of the pillars of the Yalta-Potsdam international system. Starting from the 1990s, I've been hearing voices that the Yalta-Potsdam System is a thing of the past, that it is history because the breakup of the Soviet Union, et cetera. But I strongly believe that, the world which we live in these days, to a very significant extent, is the continuation of the legacy of the Yalta-Potsdam System and the postwar international law. The UN Security Council still is the pivot of international politics. This is something which we inherited from the decisions of victorious powers in 1945.

Up to now, there is not a single permanent member of the Security Council, not to mention non-permanent members, which would not value, in the highest way possible, their membership in the Security Council, their status in international affairs. We see these days that, in spite of the fact that for quite a long time, the Security Council was a place of diplomatic battles and diplomatic skirmishing, nowadays this is a place where different discussions, reflecting shifts in the world order, take place. Take the recent resolution, which was on the Ukrainian crisis, which was supported by the United States, Russia, China, and the other two permanent members abstained - France and the UK. Only such a unique platform as the United Nations may be the place where such kind of fundamental things may happen.

I think that the legacy of the Yalta-Potsdam System is still something that for us is not a part of a distant history, but is something that is a “living history”, as we say. Because these days, we still use for our benefit the consequences of those strategic decisions which were taken by the victorious powers in 1945, including Russia and China.

翻译｜李泽西核译｜韩桦