金砖国家领导人峰会期间，北京对话（智库）联合创始人、秘书长韩桦在里约热内卢，对话巴西经济学家、曾任金砖国家新开发银行副行长保罗·巴蒂斯塔（Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr），就金砖国家新开发银行成立十年来的发展，进行了诚恳的交流。

在巴蒂斯塔看来，金砖国家新开发银行在过去十年中取得了一些成就，不仅促进了成员国之间的经济合作，还为全球金融治理体系的改革贡献了重要力量。但这远远不够，特别是在IMF体系下，发展中国家面临诸多挑战，急需新开发银行这样的组织来助力突破“西方包围”。

巴西经济学家、曾任金砖国家新开发银行副行长保罗·巴蒂斯塔接受北京对话访谈

【对话/ 北京对话 韩桦，翻译/ 李泽西】

韩桦：首先，在金砖国家新开发银行庆祝成立十周年之际，您如何评价这十年来的发展？

保罗·巴蒂斯塔：新开发银行是我们金砖国家推进的一项非常重要的倡议。这个项目雄心勃勃，无论是创始成员国，还是后来加入的一些新成员国，所投入的资本都非常可观，它已经成为全球资本规模最大的多边开发银行之一。创始成员包括巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非，现在还有自2023年以来加入的新成员国。

银行的架构已初步成型，在上海有一栋漂亮的总部大楼，大约有100名员工，已经批准并发放了不少项目贷款。

但坦率说，作为当年帮助创建这家银行的人，我对其前十年的发展略感失望。十年前，银行在上海正式启动。从中国的长远性视角来看，十年也许还只是起步；但从巴西的视角来看，我们更倾向于立竿见影，我认为我们在这十年中本可以做得更多。

例如，我们一直致力于打造一个全球性的银行，作为世界银行的替代者。但一个在成立十年后还只有十个成员国的银行，显然还称不上“全球”。这是令人失望的地方。我们应该更加努力，吸纳更多的发展中国家和新兴市场国家加入。

另一个问题是，我们金砖国家经常谈去美元化（de-dollarization），但事实上，我们自己创建的这家主要机构，在资产和负债两端仍然很大程度上依赖美元。这方面我们也应下更大功夫，更多使用本币或非美元、非欧元的其他货币进行业务操作。

尽管如此，总体而言，我认为银行的运作还算不错。我刚才提到的，只是我认为比较突出的问题。

韩桦：您提到了一些对新开发银行过去十年发展的失望之处，认为它未能很好地落实最初制定的议程，比如扩大成员国、推进去美元化等。那么从现在起，即银行进入第11年，您认为接下来的优先事项应该是什么？

保罗·巴蒂斯塔：让我再举几个我认为银行目前还需要改进的地方。

首先，任何机构都必须严格遵守其治理规则，尊重成员国所制定的运作制度。而在一些关键问题上，新开发银行并未始终做到这一点。

其次，我不理解的是，尽管银行已经成立十年，一些重要职位至今仍未补齐。最突出的例子是“首席经济学家”这一职位，这是我在2015至2017年任职期间就设想好的，但直到现在，我们都没有选出一位合适的经济学家，无论他是否来自金砖国家，甚至可以是其他国家的专家，但我们就是没有落实——这反映出一定程度上的行动迟缓。

还有就是沟通和透明度问题。很奇怪，新开发银行的透明度甚至低于国际货币基金组织和世界银行。它向外界公开的信息比布雷顿森林体系下的老机构还要少，这显然是个问题。

此外，项目执行的有效性也存在疑问。由于银行并不公开披露具体的新开发银行项目的内容，外界几乎无法了解项目的实施情况。有些人怀疑，有些项目的执行效率并不高。

所以，总体来看，虽然我们也许可以借鉴中国人的“耐心”与长远眼光，但这家银行确实需要做得更多。

不过，随着前巴西总统迪尔玛·罗塞夫出任行长，有一件积极的事情发生了。在此前的几年，这家银行几乎被世界遗忘，而作为巴西前总统，她的加入自然而然地提升了新开发银行的国际关注度，这一点非常关键。比如，中国国家主席习近平访问了上海的银行总部，过去这在其他银行是从未发生过的。因此，新开发银行正在重新获得可见性，这一点非常重要。

韩桦：就像您刚才说的，迪尔玛作为一个大国前总统，既有个人魅力，也有出色的治理能力，这是非常重要的。您刚才提到了新开发银行内部发展面临一些的问题。但如今，新开发银行还面临着很多外部变化，我们其实没有那么多时间和耐心去等待，比如去美元化、全球化、多边治理等进程，都需要新开发银行发挥更重要的作用；还有如何以本币结算金砖国家之间的贸易与合作。您如何看待这些外部压力和不断变化的动因？

保罗·巴蒂斯塔：我认为，新开发银行以及我们当时同期创建的“金砖国家应急储备安排”（CRA，也可以理解为金砖国家的货币基金），都是作为替代西方主导的机构（如IMF和世界银行）而设立的。我不会称它们为“反西方”，而是“后西方”机构，这是我们在“里约-北京对话会”期间赵隆提到的一个说法，我觉得很贴切。

因为我们在设计这些替代方案时，并不认为应该排斥西方国家的参与。或许西方国家因为傲慢自负，不愿加入金砖主导的倡议，但我们自己应该保持开放的态度。毕竟，金砖国家的本意不是制造问题和冲突，而是解决金砖自身以及其他发展中国家和新兴市场面临的问题。

韩桦：那您认为金砖国家在这方面的目标应该是什么？您在“里约-北京对话会”讨论中提到了中国人民银行（PBOC），它在去美元化中扮演了怎样的角色？加密货币又将在去美元化过程中发挥什么样的作用，是助力，还是阻力？

保罗·巴蒂斯塔：中国人民银行在全球层面发挥非常重要的潜在作用，它与全球数十个国家签署了货币互换协议，向这些国家提供的不只是美元，还有人民币。这种安排为很多国家提供了国际收支支持。例如，阿根廷就在这方面大幅依赖中国的支持。

某种意义上，中国人民银行已经在实际做那些我们金砖国家本应通过金砖国家应急储备安排去做、但却一直没能实现的事情。在金砖国家应急储备安排中，各国央行（尤其是巴西央行，在这方面最为消极）基本上让整个机制“冻结”了十年。我们没有进行任何实质性操作；我们也没能允许非美元的货币进入金砖国家应急储备安排进行结算；我们甚至还没有接纳新加入金砖机制的成员国进入金砖国家应急储备安排。

所以我们需要扩大金砖国家应急储备安排的规模和灵活性，让它真正成为IMF的一个替代选择；而IMF对很多发展中国家来说，经常是“雪上加霜”的存在。

金砖国家新开发银行永久总部

韩桦：那么我们该如何扩展这个机制？如何真正“并肩作战”？

保罗·巴蒂斯塔：我参与了金砖国家应急储备安排的谈判和创建，它的治理机制从一开始就有点太僵化。我们原本应该设置得更灵活一些，但问题是，各国央行——不一定是中国人民银行，它在谈判中其实更积极、更合作，更愿意提出替代方案；但像巴西央行（问题不只是巴西央行，但是我先我的国家的央行说起），从一开始就很担心这一机制可能会牺牲本国的外汇储备，比如要把钱借给南非，南非被认为会利用该机制。而南非央行在制定机制的过程中也显得非常谨慎保守。

但就算机制设计有缺陷，我们也完全可以在现有架构下“活络”和扩张金砖国家应急储备安排。没有什么条款是禁止新国家加入金砖国家应急储备安排的。比如埃塞俄比亚最近刚加入金砖政治机制，为什么不能也加入金砖国家应急储备安排呢？埃塞俄比亚需要国际收支支持。如果我们能支持埃塞俄比亚减少对IMF的依赖，那在地缘政治上是非常有意义的。可惜的是，十年过去了，这一机制几乎“原地踏步”。新开发银行这几年至少还有一些进展，但金砖国家应急储备安排作为金砖货币基金，几乎毫无起色。

韩桦：是的，中国人民银行现在的确在以一种相对灵活的方式推进这些安排，也授权一些下属机构先“摸着石头过河”。您提到了埃塞俄比亚的例子，我觉得这其实也正说明贵国央行在这个问题上应该更积极一些。

保罗·巴蒂斯塔：我要说明一下，我说的“巴西央行”不是卢拉总统现在任命的央行行长，而是整个巴西央行体制本身的问题；它极其保守，而且非常倾向西方。这种体制本身就对我们10年前设立的这些机制“天生怀疑”，这就阻碍了机制的正常运转。

韩桦：我也想和您分享，在中国人民银行和整个中国金融系统中，其实也长期存在“西方化”的倾向。大约从10年前到现在，很多高层乃至中层管理人员都是在西方，尤其是在美国受教育的，所以他们对西方的思维方式、操作逻辑是比较熟悉甚至认同的。

但与此同时，也有另一个推动力量，是我们做的“中国特色”的尝试；不算是反西方，而是探索我们自己的路径。这两种力量是在同时推进的，我们也还在观察。不过可以肯定的是，中国人民银行现在的表现确实更为灵活。

保罗·巴蒂斯塔：这其实也是我们金砖国家一个共同的弱点，只是程度不同而已：西方影响力在我们的社会和政府中仍然太强大。中国的情况可能好一些，但像巴西，美国影响力非常深，甚至有不少势力在批评金砖，亲近美国。在俄罗斯，我的一些朋友也告诉我，尽管俄乌冲突已经让俄罗斯基本上与西方进入“准战争状态”，但在俄罗斯内部仍然有“亲西方的第五纵队”。俄罗斯19世纪以来就有个专门的术语，称他们为“西方派”或“欧化派”（Occidentalists）。这个问题在今天仍然存在。

再看像墨西哥、阿根廷、甚至埃及和埃塞俄比亚这些国家，它们在不同程度上也都深受西方影响。这种影响并不总是正面的，很多时候反而会造成国家动荡、发展受限。

韩桦：很高兴人们现在开始意识到这个问题，整个体系太“西方中心”了。毕竟，从所谓的新自由主义国际秩序开始，全球“西化”已经有了至少80年的历史。这自然引出一个问题：在当前地缘政治问题不断上升的时代，联合国、世贸组织和国际货币基金组织这些多边机构，还有希望继续有效运作吗？

保罗·巴蒂斯塔：我可以明确说，世贸组织现在正处于危机中，至少目前，它实际上已经“死亡”了，是多边机制瘫痪最严重的一个。这一部分原因（虽然不是全部，但相当大一部分原因），是美国的阻挠，它不允许世贸组织按照原定机制正常运作。

联合国的情况没有那么糟，但它也存在某种程度的瘫痪。比如说，联合国安理会很难达成一致意见，总是有至少一个国家在否决安理会的行动。

IMF的情况稍微好一点。我在那里工作了8年，从2007年到2015年，我对这个机构非常熟悉。我们在当时确实取得了一些进展，特别是2008年和2010年的治理改革，我也参与其中。这些改革扩大了发展中国家的投票权和份额，中国的份额显著提高，巴西也是。

目前需要注意的是，如果我们在IMF内部作为金砖国家或“金砖+”进行有效协调，我们实际上对一些关键决策拥有“否决权”，因为IMF某些决议需要85%的投票多数，而我们合起来能一票否决。但一票否决权本质上是一种“消极力量”，金砖国家目前还没有足够的力量去“积极推动”改革。

我可以告诉你，2008年和2010年进行的投票权和份额改革，是IMF历史上规模最大的一次制度性变动。但就算如此，它也没有从根本上动摇西方对IMF的掌控。

更糟糕的是，自那之后的15年，IMF的治理改革几乎没有丝毫进展。我也不觉得未来会有什么突破。

我们必须现实一点。作为西方控制的工具，IMF和世界银行不太可能进行任何根本性的改革。我们或许可以努力争取一些微调，但西方对它们的掌控太强了。你知道为什么他们对继续改革迟疑不前吗？很大一部分原因就是中国。无论用什么标准衡量，中国在IMF和世界银行中的权重都应该比现在大得多。但美欧就是不愿意接受这一点，这成为根本性改革全面瘫痪的原因之一。

这也说明了我们金砖国家必须现实：要建设我们自己的机制，因为IMF和世界银行作为机构只能起到“有限作用”，它的惯性和西方“必须掌控一切”的思维限制了它。

韩桦：这也就更加突显出新开发银行的重要性。那么，新开发银行应如何填补现有治理结构的空白，推动真正的进展？关于一票否决权，罗塞夫行长在记者会上也说过，新开发银行治理中没有任何国家拥有一票否决权，每个国家的声音也都应被倾听。这两种说法——既强调灵活、又要尊重每个成员国意愿——如何兼容呢？

保罗·巴蒂斯塔：我认为罗塞夫行长说得完全正确。我们在设计新开发银行时，就是想让它成为一个更灵活的机构，尊重成员国的国家主权和已有政策，而不是像世行那样附带各种附加条件、强行改变别国制度。

你知道，世界银行总是试图改变借款国的体制，提出各种苛刻条件，IMF也是如此。而新开发银行的本意就是作为世界银行的替代品，而不是IMF的替代品。我们原本是想让金砖国家应急储备安排来对标IMF，但很遗憾，金砖国家应急储备安排至今仍处于“冻结”状态。

所以我们现在需要让新开发银行在某些情况下，也能灵活提供国际收支支持，比如帮助外汇困难的国家渡过难关。

巴西总统卢拉与新开发银行行长罗塞夫在金砖峰会前夕参加纪念活动

韩桦：就算不是金砖国家，也可以吗？

保罗·巴蒂斯塔：当然可以，尽管它们最好成为新开发银行成员。比如说，孟加拉国虽然不是金砖机制的一部分，但它已经是新开发银行的成员了。所以我们也可以帮助像孟加拉这样的国家应对收支危机。

这可能与我们最初的规划不完全一致，但我们可以根据形势变化调整这些规划，服务于金砖机制和发展中国家的实际需求。

韩桦：那么，从现在起，未来三年您理想中新开发银行的成员数量应该是多少？新开发银行的“质量性进展”又该是什么样？

保罗·巴蒂斯塔：目前我们有5个创始成员国，以及4个新成员：埃及、阿联酋、孟加拉国和阿尔及利亚。如果算上尚未完成议会程序的乌拉圭，以及最近被新开发银行理事会批准为新成员的哥伦比亚和乌兹别克斯坦，则为 7 个。

这个基础还不错，但远远不够。我认为我们应该在全球各地区——拉美、非洲、中东、南亚、东亚——大力扩展成员国的数量。我们应该努力去做，因为你看世行和IMF，它们都拥有190个成员国。我们也应逐步构建一个能服务于大多数国家的结构体系。

当然，我们不能一蹴而就，得循序渐进。也要现实地承认，有些国家可能并不愿意加入，它们可能觉得加入不符合自身利益。

韩桦：也许有些国家已经对目前像IMF或世行这样的结构感到太习惯了。

保罗·巴蒂斯塔：没错。有些国家更靠近西方，对参与金砖倡议持保留态度。比如说墨西哥，这是一个伟大的国家，但它结构上与美国紧密绑定，即便现在的总统克劳迪娅·谢因鲍姆较此前墨西哥总统更为独立。

还有一个比较微妙的问题，也许是我们在设计新开发银行时犯下的一个错误，那就是在新开发银行的治理结构中，五个创始成员国拥有了过多的权重。这就导致一些本身很大的国家会问：既然我是个大国，为什么只拿到很少的份额？比如说印尼。我们希望印尼加入，但也许印尼不加入的原因正是因为它本身非常重要，体量比南非还大。而根据我们当初设定的治理规则，它只能获得极少的配额和投票权，这显然让人难以接受。

韩桦：到底能获得多少？

保罗·巴蒂斯塔：具体数值要看怎么计算，但你知道，五个创始成员每个占有20%的份额，而且有一条规定：他们的总投票权不能低于55%。这就产生了限制：像土耳其和印尼这样的较大国家，不会愿意被当作小国来对待。不过土耳其可能因为政治原因不愿意加入。

所以按照我们现在的治理规则，只能吸收更多小国家。这当然也重要，全球有很多小国家希望加入银行，我们应该欢迎他们。但我承认，在当初谈判时，我们确实在这一点上犯了错误。

韩桦：我们还有机会纠正这个错误吗？

保罗·巴蒂斯塔：要修改新开发银行协定。这总是一项挑战。

韩桦：这是未来五年计划的议程之一吗？

保罗·巴蒂斯塔：我从来没有听说它在议程上。但如果我能提出建议，我会建议将此纳入议程。不过我也知道，修改协议是一个非常缓慢的过程，要经过所有成员国的议会批准。

很可惜我们犯了这个错误，要纠正它很困难，但不是不可能。而且这是让银行能够吸收与创始成员同等重要甚至更大的国家的一个必要步骤。

韩桦：不过也许，在这个长期变革的过程中，目前可以采取一些临时性的措施，让新成员国或小国感受到它们的影响力大于它们的投票权。你觉得可以采取什么措施？

保罗·巴蒂斯塔：这更多是银行内部的问题。行长和副行长们需要愿意倾听并赋予新成员发言权，即使他们国家很小。这其实是一种实践上的态度问题，我认为目前还做得不够。很遗憾，现在还不够。

韩桦：那迪尔玛有很多事情要做了。

保罗·巴蒂斯塔：是的，迪尔玛确实任务艰巨。但还有一个更难的问题：新开发银行在国际市场上发行债券，需要维持信用评级。如果有某些国家加入，有可能会影响我们的评级，从而提高银行融资成本。

我个人完全支持伊朗加入银行。实际上，2015年，伊朗是第一个表示希望加入银行的国家，我当时就在内部支持了伊朗的申请。但我也承认现实问题：伊朗的加入可能会拖低银行的信用评级，从而让我们在国际市场上融资变得更贵。所以，如果伊朗要加入，最好是与信用评级更高的国家同时加入，这样可以中和这种负面影响。

韩桦：有没有什么以项目为导向的方式可以兼顾伊朗的关切，同时不影响银行整体的信用评级？

保罗·巴蒂斯塔：我认为是有可能的。即便伊朗不正式加入银行，我们的协议中也有一个条款允许在特殊情况下向非成员国放贷。所以我们可以尝试这种方式。

韩桦：我们确实有这样的条款，对吧？

保罗·巴蒂斯塔：是的，协议里已经写明了。

韩桦：而且我们也有类似的实践案例，对吧？

保罗·巴蒂斯塔：我记得有极少数案例，可能只有一两个，是南非在与其周边国家，比如莱索托进行的小项目。但这些都属于例外。

不过从地缘政治角度来说，我认为我们必须支持伊朗。现在伊朗正在遭到美国和以色列的打压。

因此，一个支持伊朗的方式可以是，哪怕只做一些试点项目，让新开发银行与伊朗建立接触、“测试水温”。我不清楚现在是否有人在认真讨论这个思路，但有时候我们内部的人太保守、太正统、太“西方中心”了，他们可能会害怕银行与伊朗合作。

但我认为这是错误的态度。我们有责任帮助那些被不公平对待的国家，而我认为伊朗就是其中之一。

Han Hua：So the first thing first, as the NDB is celebrating its 10th anniversary, how do you evaluate the past decade?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：Well, the NDB is a very important initiative that we as BRICS took. It's an ambitious project. The amount of capital put into the bank by the founding members, and also a little bit by the new members, is very significant. It's one of the largest multilateral development banks in terms of capital in the world. And we have around the table the founding members, Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa, as well as a few new members that came in. So now the bank is in place. It has a beautiful building in Shanghai, it has about 100 employees, has approved a lot of projects, disbursed quite a lot.

But I am sort of disappointed with the progress made in the first 10 years by the bank that I helped to found. Ten years ago exactly, the bank began to function in Shanghai. And 10 years is maybe too short a period from a Chinese perspective, but a long one from Brazilian perspective, we are more immediatist. I think we could have achieved more in 10 years.

For example, we were always aiming for a global bank as an alternative to the World Bank. But you cannot be a global bank with only 10 members after 10 years of existence. That's a disappointment. We should work harder to bring in new countries, new developing countries, emerging market countries into the bank. That's one thing.

The other thing is that although we, as BRICS countries, we speak a lot about de-dollarization, the major institution we created, which is the NDB, is still—not fully, but substantially dollarized on the asset and on the liability sides. So we must work harder to rely more on national currencies other than the dollar or the euro for the operations we do as a bank. But mostly I think the bank is doing fine. I just gave two examples of the several challenges that I see in the bank.

Han Hua：So, you are suggesting some disappointment regarding NDB’s development over the past 10 years. You’re suggesting there may be a serious lack of its agenda, set 10 years ago, in terms of the membership countries, in terms of its de-dollarization agenda. So what else? What's the priorities you think from now, from the 11th years of its development, which should be taken priority?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：Let me give you a few other examples of where I think we are lagging in the NDB. For example, it's very important for an institution to respect its governance rules, to strictly apply the rules that were created by the countries. And this sometimes does not happen in the bank on a number of important issues. That's one thing.

Another is that, for reasons that I do not understand, a number of important positions in the bank have not been filled in after 10 years. There are several cases. One that comes to my mind is the position of chief economist, which was envisaged when I was there between 2015 and 2017. For some reason, we never managed to select a good economist and put keep him there. Not necessarily a national of a BRICS country, maybe even a national of another country. But we have not done that. That's an example of some sort of slowness.

The other thing is that communication and transparency are weak. You know, strangely, the transparency of the NDB is less than that of the IMF or the World Bank. It provides less information to the outside public than the Bretton Woods institutions, which is also a problem.

So, I think we need to make progress in all these matters, also on the effectiveness of projects. Since we don't know any details about the projects that the NDB is undertaking, the bank does not make them public, we cannot assess this crucial aspect. But here is a suspicion on the part of some people, that some of the projects are not conducted very efficiently.

In sum, maybe we need Chinese patience, a long run view, but it is fair to say that the bank needs to do more. With former president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, as president of the bank, one important thing happened, among others. The bank was being forgotten in the world in the last years. When she came in, being a former president of a country, she automatically raised the profile of the bank, something which is quite important. For instance, President Xi Jinping visited the bank in Shanghai. This never happened before. And so, the bank is gaining visibility, which I think is a very important point for any international institution

Han Hua：That shows the, like you said, Dilma's personal charisma as well as capability, as a large country's former president. So this is quite important. And you mentioned some internal issues regarding next step development.

And they are facing a lot of external change, that we don't have the luxury or patience to wait, such as the movements towards de-dollarization, globalization, multilateral governance, which all needs NDB to play a more important role; also how to settle the trade and other cooperation among the BRICS using the local currencies. So what do you think of these external pressures as well as changing motivations?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：You see, I think the NDB, as well as the contingent reserve arrangement that we created at the same time, the monetary fund of the BRICS, they are institutions that are conceived to be alternatives to the Western-dominated institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. I wouldn't say they are anti-Western, I would say they are post-Western, to use an expression used in a debate we had here in Rio by Zhao Long.

I think that's an apt way of putting it, because when we conceive alternatives, we do not believe that they should exclude Western countries, potentially. Maybe the Western countries are too proud and arrogant to join initiatives that the BRICS might take, but we should be open to that. Because the BRICS are not in the business of creating problems, conflicts. We are in the business of solving the problems of the BRICS and other countries, other emerging market and developing countries.

Han Hua：So, what do you think, then, should be the goal of the BRICS in this regard? How would you comment on the role of PBOC? You mentioned PBOC in our debate the day before. So what role has the PBOC played in this de-dollarization movement, or alternatively, what role will the cryptocurrencies play in either helping or hindering the process of de-dollarization?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：Let me say that the PBOC has played a role that is very important in the world, because it's initiating a number of currency swap agreements with dozens of countries around the world, through which it supplies not only US dollars, but also Chinese currency. This is a source of balance of payment support for a number of countries. Argentina, for example, has relied substantially on that. The PBOC is doing, more effectively, what we could have done and have not yet done as BRICS in the Contingent Reserve Arrangement. Because in the CRA, to use the acronym,  our central banks, and the Brazilian central bank is one of the worst in this respect, have frozen the arrangement since 2015. We have not done any operations. We have not yet allowed currencies other than the US dollar to be used in the CRA. We have not yet allowed the new members of the BRICS political formation to come in. We need to expand the CRA and make it more flexible, so that we can provide as a group an alternative to the IMF that often works unfavorably to developing countries that need balance of payments support.

Han Hua：But how to expand, how to work in line with this, like work shoulder by shoulder in this regard?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：Well, the governance of this Contingent Reserve Arrangement that I helped to create, because I was in the negotiations that led to its creation, is a bit too rigid; it should have been more flexible from the beginning. But our central banks were always making it difficult to make the arrangement flexible. Not so much, I think, the PBOC. The PBOC was more cooperative and more willing to present alternatives and proposals in the negotiation.

But, for example, the Brazilian Central Bank, not only the Brazilian Central Bank, but let me mention our central bank, was always very afraid that this mechanism could compromise Brazilian reserves in possible lending to South Africa. South Africa is seen as a potential taker. And, strangely enough, the Central Bank of South Africa was also very rigid in the definition of the arrangement.

But still, with all the shortcomings of the way we put it together, the CRA is there and we could flexibilize and expand it. There's nothing that prohibits the entry of new countries into the CRA. And it would also be interesting to expand the size of the CRA, increase the size of the pool. For example, take a country like Ethiopia that recently joined the BRICS political formation. Why not have Ethiopia in our monetary fund, in our CRA? Because Ethiopia actually needs balance of payments support. And this would help Ethiopia become less dependent on the IMF. So, it's important geopolitically to have this arrangement function well. And I'm sorry to say that after 10 years of existence, it's practically frozen. The NDB has made some progress. But the CRA, the monetary fund of the BRICS, has made very little progress.

Han Hua：Yeah, PBOC is taking a flexible approach in doing so, and having some of its sub-branches to make—it's in line with the spirit of touching the stone and testing water. You mentioned the case of Ethiopia. I think that could be something that your central bank is doing more aggressively on this.

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：The Brazilian Central bank is, and mind you, not the current governor appointed by President Lula. But the machinery of the institution is extremely conservative and also Western-oriented. It does not really look favorably on initiatives like the one we took 10 years ago. This hampers the functioning of the CRA.

Han Hua：On this, I have to share with you that in PBOC or in the financial system within China, there is always this mood, about 10 years ago and until now, there is always this Western mood, because most of the top level as well as the middle level management team are educated in the Western countries, especially in the United States. So, there is something Western oriented by instinct. But then there is another driver to do this thing, maybe it's not that anti-Western, but doing something with our own characteristics. This is like two movements, parallel. So, we will also wait to see, but certainly PBOC sounds flexible.

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：I think that's one of the weaknesses of our countries, in varying degrees. There's too much Western influence in the societies and the governments. Even in the case of China, I understand that there is this problem also, but less than in a country like Brazil, where the forces that look to the United States and criticize the BRICS are more important than they are in China. Even Russia, a country effectively at war with the West through Ukraine, even there, my Russian friends tell me, they have these fifth columns, these people oriented towards the West. There's a classical term for that in Russia, Westerners, Occidentalists, that goes back to the 19th century. This remains to this day an issue in Russia. If you look at countries like Mexico, Argentina, Brazil to a lesser extent, Ethiopia and Egypt, you won’t fail to notice that they are very influenced by Western forces. And this is not always good. Often it's bad. Often it destabilizes countries. It hampers their development.

Han Hua：Glad people are realizing that. It's too Western oriented. After all, it's about 80 years at least of this westernization since the so-called new liberal international order. This leads us to this question very naturally in this age of rising geopolitical issues. Do multilateral organizations like the UN, WTO, or the IMF still have hope of functioning effectively?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：Well, the WTO is in a crisis. It's effectively dead, at least for now. It's the worst case of paralysis among international institutions. And this is partly due, not only, but partly to the action of the United States that is not allowing the WTO to function as foreseen.

The UN is not so bad, but even there you have a sort of paralysis. For example, the Security Council rarely reaches the consensus needed to take decisions. There's always one country at least vetoing any major movement of the Security Council.

The IMF is a little better. I was there, as you know, for eight years from 2007 to 2015. I know the institution pretty well. We have made some progress there, especially in the reforms of 2008 and 2010, in which I participated. These reforms led to an increase in the role of the developing countries, their voting power and quotas. China notably rose, Brazil also.

And today it's important to note that if we coordinate effectively as BRICS or BRICS Plus inside the IMF, we hold veto power over decisions requiring an 85% majority. These are sometimes very important. However, veto power is a negative force. As BRICS, we do not enjoy sufficient support to make positive changes.

And I can tell you, the change in quotas and votes that happened in 2008, 2010, are the largest changes ever made in the institution. They are in place. However, they do not fundamentally change the hold of the West on the institution.

The IMF is so conservative that in all its history, for the first time, there was a significant move in quotas and votes in the 2008 and 2010 reforms. Not a fundamental change, as I said. But the worst part of this is that nothing has happened since, 15 years later. The process of change in IMF governance has not moved an inch since. And I don't expect that it will move forward in the foreseeable future.

I think we should be realistic. The IMF and the World Bank, controlled by the West, will not make any changes of fundamental nature. We can work together for partial adjustments, which might be useful for the institutions. But the Western grip on the IMF and the World Bank is strong and will remain so . And you know, one reason why they are reluctant elected to move forward is China. Because under any metric that you might want to choose, China should be much larger in the IMF and the World Bank than it currently is. And the United States and Europe, simply do not want that. So, this paralyzes completely any fundamental change in governance; this is one of the major reasons that paralyze the reform of the Fund and the Bank. So, let's continue to build our own mechanisms . The IMF and the World Bank will work only to a certain extent, because of their inertia as institutions and the Western view that they must control the process.

Han Hua：So that shows how important NDB is down the road. So how should NDB fill in this gap of lacking the governance and the progress? And speaking of the veto power as well, President Rousseff, mentioned in yesterday's press conference, saying that every country needs to be heard, no veto power in the NDB's governance. Forgive my ignorance, how these two goals can be matched together?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：Well, President Dilma Rousseff is quite right, because we conceived the New Development Bank as a more flexible institution that would take into account the interests of the countries that resort to the bank, not dictate rules, but respect the rules and policies that already exist in the any country that comes to us to obtain loans.

As you know, that's often not the case. The World Bank, for example, is always trying to change the system in the borrowing country, introduce conditionalities; it's very common, as well as the IMF, as you also know. Now, when we constructed the NDB, we conceived it as an alternative to the World Bank, not to the IMF.

The alternative to the IMF was supposed to be the Contingent Reserve Arrangement of which we spoke. But practically speaking, the CRA is frozen by our central banks. So, we must be flexible to allow the NDB to fulfill some balance of payment support operations. Loans that can help countries that are facing foreign exchange difficulties.

Han Hua：Even non BRICS countries?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：Even non BRICS countries, but perhaps they should be members of the NDB. For example, Bangladesh is not a member of the BRICS political formation, but it's a member of the NDB, so we can help countries like Bangladesh and others to face up to possible balance of payments difficulties.

It's not strictly compatible with our initial plans. But we can adapt our plans as time goes by to face the needs of the BRICS process and of the developing countries.

Han Hua：So ideally, for example, in the next three years, what's the quantity of the NDB members in your mind? And what's about the quality of its progress in your mind?

Paulo Nogeira Batista Jr：Well, as I said, we have the five founding members and four new countries only: Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Bangladesh, and Algeria. Seven if you count Uruguay, that has yet to complete parliamentary procedures, and Colombia and Uzbekistan that have very recently been approved as new members by the Board of Governors of the NDB. Now, this is fine, but we need much more. We need to have a large number of countries in all regions of the world, in Latin America, in Africa, in the Middle East, in South Asia, in East Asia. We need to strive for that, because look at the membership of the World Bank, 190 countries; the IMF has also 190 countries. We should be able to build a structure capable of dealing with a large number of countries.

Of course, we cannot do that suddenly. We need to do it step by step. Also, to be realistic, some countries may not want to join the bank. They might feel that it's not in their interest to join the bank.

Han Hua：Maybe they grow so comfortable with the current structure like IMF or World Bank.

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：That's right. Some are politically closer to the West and are reluctant to enter into a BRICS initiative. For example, Mexico, a great country, but structurally very linked to the United States. Even with President Claudia Sheinbaum, so much more independent than some other Mexican presidents.

And also there's a subtle point, which is a mistake we made when we constructed the NDB. In the structure of the bank, too much weight is given to the five founding members. So other countries that are large would ask, why should I be able to get a small quota? For example, Indonesia. We would like to see Indonesia in the bank. But perhaps the reason why Indonesia doesn't come in is that it's a very large country, very important, larger than South Africa, for example. And why should it obtain, because of the governance rules we formulated, a small share of quotas in voting power?

Han Hua：How small?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：It depends on the exact calculations, but you know, the five founding members entered initially with 20% each, and there's a limit. They cannot fall below 55% of the voting power. This creates a restriction because countries like Turkey and Indonesia, for example, are too large to be treated as small countries. Although Turkey may not be politically willing to join.

So ,with the governance rules that we now have, we can expand mostly with small countries. That's important too. There are many small countries around the world that want to join the bank, and we should allow them to come in. But I recognize that we made a mistake in the negotiations.

Han Hua：Do we have a chance to fix that?

Paulo Nogeira Batista Jr：We need to amend the Articles of Agreement. But that's always a challenge.

Han Hua：Is it on the agenda of the next five years plan?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：I never heard that it is on the agenda. I would suggest that it be. If I could make a suggestion, we should amend the Articles. But I recognize that the amendment of the Articles is always a slow process. It has to go through Parliament or other internal procedures of the countries involved.

Unfortunately, we made that mistake. To correct it is difficult, but not impossible. And this would be important to allow the bank to take in new members that are as large as or even larger than founding members.

Han Hua：But probably, even with this process in the long run, currently there can be some measures to be taken, to let the small members or the new members, to realize that they have some weight that is bigger than their voting weight in the system. What kind of measures that can be taken?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：This is more something internal to the bank. The president and the vice presidents need to be willing to accommodate and listen to, give a voice to the new members, even if they're very small. It's a matter of practice, of attitude, which I believe is not often there. Unfortunately, this is not often there.

Han Hua：Dilma has a lot to do.

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：Dilma has a lot to do. And there's another difficulty that should be mentioned. The bank issues bonds in the international markets, it has a credit rating. This credit rating might be hurt depending on the kind of country that comes in.

I'm totally in favor of Iran, for example, joining the bank. In fact, Iran was the first country to come to us back in 2015 to join the bank. And I supported Iran's request from inside the bank at that time, But I recognized there was a problem, that Iran would perhaps lower the credit rating of the bank and make it more expensive for us to fund in the capital markets. So, if Iran is to come in, it should come in together with countries that have a better credit rating. This neutralizes the downgrade.

Han Hua：Is there any project-based measures that can be on one way to take Iran's concern into consideration by NDB, but do not risk lowering the whole thing?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：I think there is another possibility even if Iran does not join the bank. Our governance structure, our Articles of Agreement allow the bank in exceptional circumstances to lend to a country that is not a member. So, we could try that.

Han Hua：We have this clause, right?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：We have this clause already.

Han Hua：You have also some practices, right?

Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr：I believe there's very few. I think only one or two South African projects with countries very small and very near to South Africa. Lesotho, for example. But these are exceptions. I think that geopolitically speaking, we need to support Iran. Iran is under attack by the United States and Israel.

So, one way of supporting Iran would be to allow some projects, a few at least, to test the waters between the NDB and Iran. But I don't know if that is being discussed. You know, sometimes our people are too conservative, too orthodox. and a little bit too Western oriented. So, they might be afraid to allow the bank to operate with Iran, but that's not the correct attitude. We have, I believe, a duty to help countries that are being unfairly treated, and Iran is one.

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