【文/于滨】

一个幽灵正在西方徘徊——中俄联盟的幽灵，无论是确有其事，还是捕风捉影。如今西方正竭尽全力向乌克兰运送致命武器，美国却突然对华发难，质疑中国在乌克兰问题上一贯的中立立场。然而，中国中立不仅是为了自身利益，也是为了维护世界稳定。如今乌克兰战祸不已，满目疮痍，且冲突很可能长期化，甚至进一步升级。在基辛格一直警示的充斥大规模杀伤性武器和人工智能的“严峻新世界”中（Kissingerian grave new world），美国这一“非友即敌”的2.0版本犹如一纸最后通牒。

中国特色的中立

中国在乌克兰问题上的中立态度是真诚的，因为俄罗斯和乌克兰都是中国的朋友或“战略伙伴”，中国驻华盛顿大使秦刚将这一立场其定义为“客观公正”。中国要二者之间选边站是非常困难的，如果不是完全不可能的话。事实是，持续的战争正在严重损害中国的利益，包括“一带一路”倡议下庞大的对外投资项目，而乌克兰正是“一带一路”的重要区域枢纽。2021年，中乌贸易额同比增长35%，规模达193亿美元。尽管这比中俄贸易额（1470 亿美元）要小得多，但中乌贸易额在过去五年中已经翻了一倍多。

早在 2013 年底，当乌克兰陷于俄罗斯和欧盟之间的两难困境时，中国一举向乌克兰提出 80 亿美元的投资协议。尽管这比俄罗斯的150 亿美元援助计划要小，但它远多于欧盟44 亿欧元的计划。

中国在乌克兰问题上的中立并非纯粹出于商业目的，它是人道主义、实用主义和政治现实主义共同作用的结果。4月1日，在与欧盟领导人夏尔·米歇尔（欧洲理事会主席）和乌尔苏拉·冯德莱恩（欧盟委员会主席）的电话会议中，中国领导人敦促各方为乌克兰战争的政治解决而努力，同时避免局势升级和更大的人道主义灾难。从长远来看，中国领导人呼吁欧盟/美国和俄罗斯之间进行对话，以构建“均衡、有效、可持续的欧洲安全机制”。

对许多中国人来说，乌克兰战争的破坏性令人痛心。中国人民大学最近的一项研究表明，30%的受访者支持俄罗斯的“特别军事行动”，20%支持乌克兰，40%保持中立。许多人担心，当前在乌克兰冲突上争先恐后、火上浇油的引战言行，会导致战争进一步扩大化。在大规模杀伤性武器时代，必须在政治和外交领域寻求冲突的解决之道。因此，中国政府呼吁各方保持克制并通过谈判尽早结束战争，这得到了中国人的广泛支持。中国捐助的三批人道主义援助物资已运往乌克兰，后续更多援助物资也在路上。

因此，中国的中立不仅仅是被动应对，而是基于原则的，意在促使各方达成均衡和可持续安全。相比之下，美国在巴巴罗萨行动（译注：1941 年6 月22日—1942年1月，纳粹德国在第二次世界大战中发起侵苏行动的代号）和珍珠港事件（1941年12月7日）之间数月中的孤立主义并非那般光鲜（not-so-splendid isolation）。当时的参议员哈里·杜鲁门对此直言无讳。德国入侵苏联两天后，《纽约时报》援引这位未来的美国总统的话称：“如果德国占上风，我们应该帮助俄罗斯，如果俄罗斯占上风，我们就帮助德国，这样我们就能尽可能让他们互相残杀……” 不到六个月后，珍珠港事件爆发，美国卷入战争，接下来的历史人尽皆知。

进入21世纪，中国在混乱的世界中稳步崛起，并从历史上的儒家思想汲取智慧。儒家思想的一个关键组成部分是中庸，即保持中道、避免极端。在1950-1970年代内外政策发生巨大波动后，中国从1982年开始奉行不结盟的独立自主外交政策，基辛格在其2011年的《论中国》（On China）一书中，将其描述为“公正务实”（impartial and pragmatic），这与秦刚大使的表述非常相似。这种立场不仅适用于当前的乌克兰战争，也应用于2014年的乌克兰-克里米亚危机、2008年的格鲁吉亚-俄罗斯冲突，以及1980年代以来的朝核问题，因为中国反对任何破坏半岛稳定的举动。

杰克·马特洛克（Jack Matlock），1987-1991年美国驻苏联大使，著有《苏联解体亲历记》一书。

西方现实主义者去哪儿了？

在中国公共舆论空间对乌克兰问题的各种不同观点中，乔治·凯南等西方现实主义者占据一席之地。凯南在25 年前曾警告说，北约东扩是“整个后冷战时代美国政策最致命的错误”（the most fatal error）。在 1997 年向参议院外交关系委员会作证时，杰克·马特洛克（Jack Matlock，1987-1991年美国驻苏联大使）也表达了类似的深切担忧，即“误入歧途的”北约扩张“很可能被作为自冷战结束以来最严重的战略失误而载入史册。” 2014 年乌克兰-克里米亚危机后不久，基辛格也警告说，鉴于其几个世纪以来作为俄罗斯一部分的独特历史，乌克兰只有作为俄罗斯与西方之间“桥梁” 而非战场，才能获得生存和繁荣。西方现实主义者的这些观点以前只出现在中国的学术圈子里，现在则在公共空间中随处可见。

对于许多中国人来说，政治现实主义在西方关于乌克兰问题的语境中的缺位是很奇怪的。如果这些清醒的、尽管“政治上不正确”的观点在西方得到重视，乌克兰目前的战争本可以避免。因此，西方关于俄罗斯“无端入侵” （unprovoked invasion）乌克兰的说法不能令多数中国人信服。相较于亨利·基辛格所描述的美式唯我论（solipsism）——无法以不同的方式看待世界，中国人的思想要开放得多。

中俄之间: 一种“独具一格”的成熟关系

2022年2月4日，中俄领导人在北京冬奥会开幕前签署的联合声明称：“两国友好没有止境，合作没有禁区”。尽管如此，这种长达数十年的“战略伙伴关系”的最新发展，并不意味着结成军事联盟。它没有类似于北约第5条规定的相互约束机制，亦即在冲突情况下自动锁定的彼此的承诺。实际上，在克里米亚、中国台湾、中国南海、中印边界争端等问题上，莫斯科和北京几乎对彼此的所有“核心利益”都保持不置可否或中立的态度。

这种友好而灵活的战略伙伴关系框架的关键驱动因素之一是历史的经验教训。1950年至1989年间，中苏关系经历了从同盟到敌对的急剧转向，双方为此付出巨大代价。此后，两国将高度意识形态化和危险的军事化关系转化为一种务实的共存关系，其核心因素是意识形态缺位。在中苏在“蜜月期”（1949-1959年），意识形态因素夸大了的双方的友谊，又放大了中苏长达30 年间“决裂期”（1960-1989年）的分歧。从某种意义上说，目前的中俄“战略伙伴关系”，无论是否有止境，都是双方在经历“最好”和“最坏”时代之后的一种正常关系。

自 1989 年以来的这种务实关系，也许是自1689年中俄《尼布楚条约》以来对两个大国最稳定、最平等（总体而言）和危害最小的关系。这碰巧也是双方都经历了巨大的社会经济政治转型的时期。中国或许比世界上任何其他国家都更了解俄罗斯在后苏联时代的痛苦转型中所面临的巨大风险、挑战和困难。而且，与西方一些国家不同，中国没有利用俄罗斯的弱点来获取任何短期利益。俄罗斯的民族自豪感（pride）应该得到尊重，尤其是在俄罗斯处于历史性衰退的时刻。

中俄战略伙伴关系并非一帆风顺。相反，它的某些方面“存在麻烦”，甚至是“有争议的”，普京在2017年10月的瓦尔代演讲中如是表示。但他补充说，这些方面的问题经过深思熟虑后“找到了妥协的解决办法”，因此没有“使局势陷入僵局”。双方都将当前的中俄关系描述为“成熟”的关系，这与1950至1970年代高度政治化的过往经历形成鲜明对比。中俄完全有理由排除外部干扰，继续保持这种关系。

最后，中国和俄罗斯是两个大型的文明实体，无论其经济地位如何，它们都具有追求各自独立的外交和战略目标的物质和思想能力。它们在外交政策中的这种倾向伴随着它们在不同程度上对其文化/宗教遗产的回归：即中国的儒家思想，以及俄罗斯带有浓厚东正教色彩的“温和保守主义”。

2022年2月4日，俄罗斯总统普京出席北京冬奥开幕式。@视觉中国

“西方新内战”亟需真正的中立

中俄双边关系的稳定和意识形态因素的缺位对世界其他地区产生了巨大影响。这意味着这两个大国历史性地回归以互不干涉内政为核心的威斯特伐利亚主义（Westphalianism），威斯特伐利亚主义是现代世界主权国家体系的基础，它虽然发轫于西方，但现在基本上被西方完全抛弃了。

除了北约不断东扩外，冷战后西方无休止的民主促进和政权更迭战争构成所谓“自由国际秩序”，在尼尔·弗格森（Niall Ferguson）看来，这种秩序既不自由，也谈不上有序。从这个意义上说，那些警告冷战卷土重来的人，似乎对历史缺乏了解。冷战期间，尽管世界超级大国在军事和意识形态上相互对峙，但由于存在各种正式和非正式的游戏规则、包括各种可验证的军备控制机制，它们之间恰恰维持了“长期和平”（long peace）。在这个两极体系中，安全是相互的，双方都有克制，特别是在 1962 年古巴导弹危机之后，美国总统肯尼迪公开呼吁“真正的和平，那种让我们的生活值得过下去的和平，那种让人类和国家能够发展、饱含希望并为他们的后代建立更美好生活的和平——这不仅是美国人的和平，而且是所有人的和平，不仅是我们时代的和平，而且是永久的和平。”

现今的世界离这种理想主义和清醒认知相去甚远。随着西方自由主义与其社会主义对手（苏联）的均衡被打破，西方以牺牲包括俄罗斯在内的世界其他地区的安全为代价，追求单边和绝对安全。因此，乌克兰成为了凯南所说的“致命错误”引发的反弹（blowback）。

在发表于1993年的《文明的冲突》这篇极具争议的论文中，亨廷顿提出了区别于福山版本的自由主义历史“终结论”的另一套终结论，即冷战的终结是“西方内战”（从1648年威斯特伐利亚条约到1991年）的终结。回头看，亨廷顿的终结论不仅低估了西方自我毁灭的能力，而且低估了所谓“西方内战” 对非西方的影响。20 世纪的“西方内战”是祸及非西方世界大部分地区的“全面战争”。仅在二战中，俄罗斯和中国的伤亡人数分别为2700万和3500万。除此之外，人们不应忽视 20 世纪之前西方在世界范围内进行的一切征战和殖民统治。或许正因为如此，许多非西方国家——包括印度、巴西、南非等——都在避免制裁俄罗斯，而是呼吁克制和谈判。

保持温和与公正远比选边站更具挑战性，特别是当世界正经历二战以来最危险的冲突时刻。斯坦福大学的斯科特·萨根（Scott Sagan）的研究标明，一战前夕，欧洲两个势不两立且具有强大约束力的联盟因为受到联盟承诺（interlocking commitment) 的驱使，在一周内相互宣战。有鉴于此，北京目前的原则性和公正中立应该受到赞赏，它对选边站的危害保持了充分警惕，从而避免了在欧亚大陆上出现另一个或将引爆大战的对抗性联盟。在大规模杀伤性武器和假新闻大行其道的时代，国际社会应该为对话、和平和中立留出空间，以实现包容、不可分割和可持续的安全。

（翻译/述垚）

翻页为英文版全文：

Beijing’s Principled Neutrality In A Grave New World¹

A specter is haunting the West—the specter of a China-Russian alliance, real or imagined. As the West is rushing lethal weapons to Ukraine, Washington suddenly confronts Beijing’s long-standing neutrality as a make-or-break issue. For China, however, its neutrality is crucial for not only its own interest but also for world stability. The ongoing war in Ukraine, for all its destruction and desolation, is likely to prolong and even escalate. Welcome to the Kissingerian² grave new world of WMD and AI, plus the US’ “to-be-with-us-or-against-us” ultimatum 2.0.  

- Neutrality of Chinese Characteristics

China’s neutrality regarding the Ukraine issue—which is defined as “objective and impartial” by the Chinese ambassador to Washington Qin Gang³—is genuine for the basic fact of life that both Russia and Ukraine are China’s friends, or “strategic partners.” It is very difficult, if not impossible for China to take sides. Indeed, the ongoing war is seriously undermining China’s interests including its extensive foreign investment program of the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI), for which Ukraine has been an important regional hub. In 2021, the Sino-Ukraine trade jumped by 35% to $19.3 billion over the previous year. Although this was much smaller than trade with Russia ($147 billion), bilateral trade has been more than doubled in the past five years.

Back in late 2013 when Ukraine was torn between Russia and the EU, China went as far as to offer Ukraine an $8 billion⁴ investment deal. Although this was smaller than Russia’s $15 billion⁵ aid package, it was larger than the EU’s €4.4 billion⁶.

China’s neutrality regarding the Ukraine case is not purely commercial but is driven by a mix of humanitarianism, pragmatism, and political realism. In his teleconference with the EU leaders (Charles Michel and Ursula von der Leyen) on April 1, President Xi Jinping⁷ urged all sides to work for a political settlement of the war in Ukraine while avoiding escalation and a bigger humanitarian disaster. In the longer run, Xi called for dialogue between the EU/US and Russia for a “balanced, effective and sustainable security framework in Europe.”

For many in China, the war in Ukraine is destructive and heartbreaking. A recent study by Beijing’s Renmin University⁸ indicates that 30% of respondents support Russia’s “special military operations,” 20% side with Ukraine, and 40% remain neutral. Many are concerned about the current “you-go-low-and-I-go-lower” escalatory rhetoric and actions regarding the Ukraine conflict, leading to a much wider war. In the age of WMD, the ending of the conflict will have to be found in the politico-diplomatic realm. There has been therefore broad support among the Chinese for the government’s call for restraints and negotiations by all parties to end the war at the earliest possible time. Three shipments of Chinese humanitarian assistance have been delivered to Ukraine and more will go.

China’s neutrality, therefore, is not just passive but principled for a balanced and lasting security of all parties. This is in sharp contrast to America’s not-so-splendid isolation in the fateful months between Operation Barbarossa (22 June 1941) and Pearl Harbor (7 December 1941), which was best captured by then-Senator Harry Truman. Two days after the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the New York Times quoted the future US president “If we see that Germany is winning we should help Russia and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany and that way let them kill as many as possible…” In less than six months, America was at war and the rest is history.

Fast forward to the 21st century, China’s steady rise has been accompanied by a return to its Confucian past for wisdom in a world of chaos. A key component of Confucianism is being moderate (中庸) or staying in the middle while avoiding extremes. After huge swings in its domestic and foreign policies in the 1950s-1970s, China has since 1982 pursued an independent foreign policy of non-alliance, or what Henry Kissinger⁹ depicts as impartiality and pragmatism, which is very similar to Ambassador Qin Gang’s stance. This applies to the current Ukraine war, the 2014 Ukraine-Crimea crisis, and the 2008 Georgia-Russia conflict, as well as the Korea issue since the 1980s as China has opposed any move to destabilize the peninsular.

- Western Realists Misplaced?

Among the various competing views in China’s public space regarding the Ukraine issue are those by Western realists like George Kennan¹⁰ who warned 25 years ago that NATO eastward expansion constitutes “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era.” In his 1997 testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jack Matlock¹¹ (US ambassador to the USSR,1987-1991) echoed Kennan’s deep concerns that the “misguided” NATO expansion “may well go down in history as the most profound strategic blunder made since the end of the Cold War.” Shortly after the 2014 Ukraine-Crimea crisis, Henry Kissinger¹², too, warned that given its unique history as part of Russia for centuries, Ukraine’s survival and thriving must be based on its neutrality as a “bridge,” not a battlefield, between Russia and the West. These views of Western realists—once resided within the academic circles in China—are now ubiquitous in the public space.

For many in China, the absence of political realism in the Ukraine discourse in the West is strange. Had these sober, albeit “politically incorrect” views been heeded in their own land (the West), the current war in Ukraine could have been avoided. The Western claim of Russia’s “unprovoked invasion” of Ukraine, therefore, does not convince many in China. The country’s political system may not be as liberal as that of the U.S. The Chinese mind, however, is far more open than what Henry Kissinger depicts as solipsism¹³ in America—the inability to conceive even another way of looking at the world.

- Russia-China Alignment: A League of Its Own

“Friendship between the two states has no limits” and “there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation,” declares the Russia-China joint statement signed by Xi and Putin on 4 February 2022 before the opening of the Beijing Winter Olympics. This new wrinkle of the decades-long “strategic partnership,” nonetheless, is not a military alliance. It does not embed with it the typical interlocking mechanism, similar to that of NATO’s “sacred”¹⁴ Article 5, that would automatically commit one to the other in conflict situations. In reality, Moscow and Beijing have been either noncommittal or neutral regarding almost all of each other’s “core interests,” be they Crimea, Taiwan, South China Sea, Sino-Indian border disputes, etc.

One of the key drivers for this friendly and flexible framework of strategic partnership is the lessons of the past. Between 1950 and 1989, relations between the two communist giants underwent wide swings between alliance and adversary, with an enormous cost for both sides. Since then, the two have transformed that highly ideological and dangerously militarized relationship into one of pragmatic coexistence. A central element in this relationship is the absence of ideology, which used to exaggerate the friendship during their “honeymoon” (1949-59) and amplify disagreements during their 30-year “divorce” (1960-89). In a way, the current Russia-China “strategic partnership,” unlimited or not, is a normal relationship after the “best” and “worst” times.

Such a pragmatic relationship since 1989 is perhaps the most stable, most equal (in comprehensive terms), and least harmful for the two large powers since the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk.  It happens that this is a time when both sides have undergone huge socio-economic-political transformations. China, perhaps more than any other nation in the world, understands the enormous risks, challenges and difficulties in Russia’s painful transformation in the post-Soviet decades. And, unlike some in the West, China has refrained from taking advantage of Russia’s weakness for any short-term gains. Russia’s pride is, and perhaps should be, taken more seriously particularly when Russia is in its historical decline.

The Sino-Russian strategic partnership is not problem-free. On the contrary, some of them were “controversial” and even “contentious,” remarked Putin¹⁵ in his October 2017 Valdai speech. But these problems were deliberated, “resolved with compromised solutions” without “driving the situation into an impasse,” added the Russian president. Both sides describe the current relationship as “mature,”¹⁶ which is in sharp contrast to the highly politicized experience of the 1950–1970s. And they have every reason to preserve such a relationship regardless of any external distractions.

Last if not least, China and Russia are large civilizational entities with both materialistic and ideational capabilities to pursue their respective independent foreign and strategic goals, regardless of their economic status. This propensity in their foreign policy has gone hand in hand with their returned, to different degrees, to their cultural/religious heritages: Confucianism for China (CCP as the “Chinese Civilization Party,” ¹⁷according to Mahbubani) and “moderate conservatism”¹⁸ for Russia with a hefty dose of Eastern Orthodoxy.

- The Need for Genuine Neutrality in the “Western Civil-war” 2.0

The stability and absence of ideological factors in their bilateral ties have huge implications for the rest of the world. It means a historical return of the two large powers to the Westphalianism of noninterference in each other’s domestic affairs, the foundation of the modern world system of sovereign states pioneered—and now largely discarded—by the West.

Alongside NATO’s constant eastward expansion, the West’s endless wars of democracy promotion and regime change in the post-Cold War have led to a “liberal international order” (LIO), which is neither liberal nor orderly according to Niall Ferguson¹⁹. In that sense, those who are warning about the return of the Cold War seem to be historically blind. The Cold War, for all of its militarized and ideologized standoff between the world’s superpowers, happened to be a “long peace”²⁰ between them with formal and informal rules of the game including various verifiable arms control mechanisms. Within this system of bipolarity, security was mutual with restraint by both sides, particularly after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis when US President J.F. Kennedy²¹ publicly called for

a genuine peace, the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth living, the kind that enables men and nations to grow and to hope and to build a better life for their children—not merely peace for Americans but peace for all men and women—not merely peace in our time but peace for all time.

The world has gone a long way from that idealistic and sober reckoning. With the end of the equilibrium between Western liberalism and its socialist counterpart (Soviet Union), the West has pursued unilateral and absolute security at the expense of the security of the rest of the world including Russia. Ukraine, therefore, has become a blowback of the Kennanian “fateful error.”

In his highly provocative treatise on civilization clashes in 1993, Samuel Huntington confronted the liberalist historical “endism” (Fukuyama) with his own endism of the Cold War as the end of the “Western civil war”²² (from the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia to 1991). In retrospect, the Huntingtonian endism does not only underestimate the self-destructive power of the West, but also is an understatement at best for the non-West. The 20th century “Western civil wars” were “total wars” engulfing much of the non-Western world. Casualties for Russia and China in World War II alone were 27 million and 35 million, respectively. Beyond that, one should not discount all the wars of conquests and colonization around the world prior to the 20th-century. Maybe because of this, much of the non-West—including India, Brazil, South Africa, etc.—are staying away from sanctions against Russia but calling for restraint and negotiations.

Being moderate and impartial is far more challenging than taking sides, particularly when the world is undergoing the most dangerous conflict since the end of World War II. A Sino-Russian military alliance cannot be completely ruled out, at least hypothetically²³. Such an interlocking mechanism, however, would guarantee to repeat the fateful “Guns of August”²⁴ of 1914 when the two rigid and binding alliances in Europe declared war on each other within a week largely because of their alliance commitment, argued Scott Sagan²⁵ of Stanford University.

In this regard, Beijing’s current principled and impartial neutrality should be appreciated. In the age of the toxic mix of weapons of mass destruction and mass dissemination of fake news of various kinds, it is time to leave some room for dialogue, peace, and neutrality toward an inclusive, indivisible, and enduring security for all.

注释：

1.标题“A Grave New World”引申自赫胥黎著作“Brave New World”（《美丽新世界》）

2.US and China must heed Kissinger’s stark warnings，https://www.ft.com/content/8dc78be5-aa5a-4ea0-9692-0641acf27042

3.Qin Gang: Where we stand on Ukraine，https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/03/15/china-ambassador-us-where-we-stand-in-ukraine/

4.Ukraine's Yanukovich says deals with China may bring $8 bln investments，https://www.reuters.com/article/job-ukraine-china/update-1-ukraines-yanukovich-says-deals-with-china-may-bring-8-bln-investments-ifax-idUSL5N0JK2QO20131205

5.Vladimir Putin offers Ukraine financial incentives to stick with Russia，https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/17/ukraine-russia-leaders-talks-kremlin-loan-deal

6.EU disburses €600 million in Macro-Financial Assistance to Ukraine to address the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic，https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_5460

7.Xi calls on China, EU to add stabilizing factors to turbulent world，https://english.news.cn/20220402/fcd85a941b6344e5afcb6d165c7e39b4/c.html

8.中国专家：三成中国网民支持俄罗斯对乌克兰开展特别军事行动，https://user.guancha.cn/main/content?id=721293&s=fwzxhfbt

9.Henry Kissinger：On China（基辛格：《论中国》）

10.George Kennan：A Fateful Error，https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/05/opinion/a-fateful-error.html

11.ACURA ViewPoint Jack F. Matlock, Jr.: Today’s Crisis Over Ukraine，https://usrussiaaccord.org/acura-viewpoint-jack-f-matlock-jr-todays-crisis-over-ukraine/

12.Henry Kissinger: To settle the Ukraine crisis, start at the end，https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html

13.Henry Kissinger:Does America Need a Foreign Policy?: Toward a New Diplomacy for the 21st Century.（《基辛格：美国的全球战略》）

14.Biden says Putin 'cannot remain in power'，https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/26/politics/biden-warsaw-saturday/index.html

15.Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club，http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55882

16.Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin of Russia Attend a Gathering Marking the 70th Anniversary of the Establishment of the China-Russia Diplomatic Relations and Watch an Artistic Performance，https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/2019zt/xjpcfelsgjjjlt/201906/t20190611_710421.html

17.Kishore Mahbubani：Why the Trump Administration Has Helped China (The National Interest 8.6.20)，https://johnmenadue.com/kishore-mahbubani-why-the-trump-administration-has-helped-china-the-national-interest-8-6-20/

18.Dmitry Stefanovich ：Putin used Valdai speech to champion ‘moderate conservatism,’ but West’s insistence on seeing Russia as a threat could lead to war https://www.rt.com/russia/538570-putin-valdai-speech-russia/

19.Niall Ferguson ：The Munk Debate Series: Is the Liberal International Order Over?

20.John Lewis Gaddis：The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System

21.President John F. Kennedy ：COMMENCEMENT ADDRESS AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 10, 1963

22.Samuel P. Huntington：The Clash of Civilizations?（亨廷顿：《文明的冲突》）

23.ВАСИЛИЙ КАШИН：Россия, Китай и украинский кризис，№2 2022 Март/Апрель

24.Barbara W. Tuchman ：The Guns of August: The Outbreak of World War I

25.Scott Sagan ：1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability

Yu Bin (Ph.D Stanford) is a senior fellow at the Russian Studies Center of the East China Normal University in Shanghai and a senior fellow of the Shanghai Association of American Studies.