【文/观察者网专栏作者 周波】

一年前，中印军队在中印边境地区的加勒万河谷发生致命斗殴，造成20名印度士兵和4名中国军人死亡，其阴霾至今未散。

当北京提出帮助疫情肆虐的印度时，遭到了冷遇。印度的积怨充分说明了两国关系冷若冰霜的现状。印度外长苏杰生曾形容这种关系遭到了“深深的动摇”。

新德里街头的抗疫宣传画（图片来源：视觉中国）

在与印度学者的几次会谈中，我非常惊讶地发现他们几乎一致认为，是中国预谋在先，挑起了加勒万的冲突。这是不可能的。如果中国不得不在美国挑起的大国竞争中同美国竞争，为什么要突然分散精力，转而对抗印度呢？

由于边境地区的实际控制线（LAC）没有划定，因此中印军队对峙的情形并不罕见。按照中国的说法，自2020年4月以来，印度军队不顾中方的抗议，单方面开始在加勒万河谷修建道路和桥梁。

这次事件让人感到压抑，因为它几乎打破了两国之间长达数十年的一个默契，即不使用武力。印度总理莫迪在2017年表示，“在过去的40年里，双方没有因为边界争端向对方开过一枪”。但是在加勒万冲突中，即使双方都没有开枪，整个气氛也骤然变冷。

中印边界争端的复杂性令人望而生畏。双方甚至对边界线的长度都看法不一。中国认为边界线是2000公里，而印度认为是3488公里。按照新德里的说法，巴基斯坦于1963年非法将巴控克什米尔的5180平方公里的印度领土割让给中国。中国和印度都坚持认为加勒万河谷是自己的领土。

更糟糕的是，边境实际控制线从来没有得到核实。两国政府1993年签署的一项协定里规定，“必要时，双方将在对实际控制线有不同认识的局部地区共同核定实际控制线的方向”。但是什么时候才是“必要“的呢？

中国和印度的做法似乎不可调和。中方倾向于自上而下的方式，基本上就是在双方互谅互让的基础上进行土地交换，而印度坚持自下而上的方式，将核实实际控制线作为首选。

北京怀疑，一旦实际控制线的走向确认之后，印度就会把它当做事实上的边界线，并拒绝进一步的谈判。这种怀疑并非毫无根据，印度一直拒绝任何关于“阿鲁纳恰尔邦”的地位的谈判。中方将所谓的“阿鲁纳恰尔邦”视为中国藏南地区的一部分，指出达旺就是六世达赖的出生地。

如何预防争端演变为冲突? 前进之道是回首往事。1993年到2013年之间，中国和印度在政府和军队层面就建立信任措施达成了四项协议，这比中国与其他任何国家签署的双边信任措施协议都要多。

中印边境，一名印度士兵与中国士兵在站岗（图片来源：视觉中国）

这些信任措施内容具体，令人印象深刻：双方都重申，将把边境实际控制线两侧各自的军力减少或者限定至最低范围；主要的武器，比如坦克、步兵作战车、大口径火炮、地地导弹、地空导弹将被削减；双方应该避免在实际控制线附近举行超过一个师以上规模的大规模军事演习；双方的作战飞机不能够飞入实际控制线10公里以内。

要是这些措施都被执行就好了! 事实上, 双方都在加强在该地区的军事存在，这在危机之后并不奇怪，但是当局势降温时，两国将不得不思考如何尽量使边境地区保持和平与安宁。

一个有益的办法就是重新恢复联合工作小组，并授权联合工作小组下面的外交和军事专家找出信任措施协议里比较容易执行的部分。同时，还可以引进新的建立信任措施机制。在事件发生后，双方举行了至少11轮军长级会晤，缓解了形势。这种高级军官在前线的定期会晤应该保持下去。

双方还应考虑建立及时沟通联系的热线。中国同俄罗斯、美国、韩国和越南都有热线，据报道中国和日本也在考虑建立热线。印度和巴基斯坦经常使用热线。中印既然是近邻，还有领土争端，两国足有理由建立类似的热线。

也许双方能够迈出的最大胆一步，是在实际控制线最危险的地段建立缓冲区。这并不影响各自对边界问题的立场，但是这是双方之间脱离接触、避免冲突的最有效的办法。双方都同意在对边境实际控制线理解不一致的地区巡逻时不相互尾随。建立缓冲区是往前迈出一大步，而且也有可能。在双方部队同时撤出班公湖附近的山地后，双方事实上已经建立了一个缓冲区。

如果北京和新德里在21世纪仍然被一个殖民者留下的争端所绑架就真的可笑了，尤其是因为除了边界争端之外，双边关系并没有突出的问题。印度人讲“Hindi Chini bhai bhai”（印地语，即“印度人民和中国人民是兄弟”）的日子一去不复返了，但是中印无论如何不能变成敌人。边界问题不应该成为一个永恒的诅咒，两个核大国之间连一场常规战争都不应该发生。

（以下为2021年6月15日南华早报原文）

China and India should look back to move forward on border impasse

One year has passed since a deadly brawl between Chinese and Indian troops in the Galwan Valley in the China-Indian border areas, which resulted in the death of 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese troops. The aftermath is still being felt today.

Beijing was given the cold shoulder when it o!ered to help pandemic-devastated India. Such resentment speaks volumes of the frosty relationship, which was described by Indian Minister of External A!airs S. Jaishankar as “profoundly disturbed”.

In a few meetings with Indian scholars, I was surprised to learn how they almost invariably believed that the Galwan clash was the result of a planned attack by China. This is impossible. If China has to compete in an America-initiated great power competition, why would it suddenly divert its attention and strength away from that to take on India?

Since the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the border areas is not demarcated, it is not rare for face-offs between Chinese and Indian troops. According to the Chinese, Indian troops started to unilaterally build roads and bridges in the valley in April 2020, despite Chinese protests.

The deadly incident was dreadful in that it came closest to breaking a decades-old tacit agreement between the two countries not to use force. “In the last 40 years, not a single bullet has been fired because of [the border dispute],” Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in 2017. But the Galwan clash, even though no bullet was fired, has changed the whole atmosphere.

The complexity of the China-India border dispute is daunting. Even the length of the border is not necessarily agreed on. China believes it is 2,000km long, while India believes it is 3,488km. According to New Delhi, Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 sq km of Indian territory in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir to China in 1963. Both China and India maintained that the valley is their own territory.

To makes things worse, the LAC is not verified. A 1993 agreement between the two governments stipulates that “when necessary, the two sides jointly check and determine the segments of the Line of Actual Control where they have different views as to its alignment”. But when is it necessary?

The approaches of China and India seem irreconcilable. China prefers a top-down approach, which is basically a land swap based on mutual accommodation, while India insists on a bottom-up approach of verifying the LAC as the priority.

Beijing suspects that, once the alignment of the LAC is verified, India would take it as a de facto border and refuse further negotiations. Such suspicion is not entirely groundless. India has refused any talks on the position of Arunachal Pradesh, which China holds as part of southern Tibet, citing the reason that Tawang is the birthplace of the 6th Dalai Lama.

How to prevent the dispute from spilling over into a conflict? The way forward is to look

back. Between 1993 and 2013, China and India reached four agreements on confidence-building measures at governmental and military levels. This is more than any bilateral agreements China has signed with other countries.

And they are substantive, too, which is impressive. Both rea"rm that they shall reduce or limit their respective military forces along the LAC to minimum levels; major categories of armaments such as combat tanks, infantry combat vehicles, large-calibre guns, surface-to-surface missiles and surface- to-air missiles are to be reduced; large-scale military exercises involving more than one division in the proximity of the LAC shall be avoided; and combat aircraft should not fly within 10km of the LAC.

If only these measures were being implemented. In fact, both sides are strengthening their military presence in the region. This is no surprise in the wake of a crisis. But when the situation cools down, both countries will have to think about how they can best make the border areas peaceful and tranquil.

One way is to resume the joint working group and ask the diplomatic and military experts working under it to find the low-hanging fruits in the confidence-building agreements. New confidence- building measures could also be ushered in. In the wake of the incident, at least 11 rounds of corps- commander-level talks were held, which helped to de-escalate the situation. Such regular meetings of front-line senior military officers should be maintained.

Both sides should also consider establishing hotlines for real-time communication. China has military hotlines with Russia, the United States, South Korea and Vietnam. Reportedly, China and Japan are considering establishing one as well. India often uses its hotline with Pakistan. There is no reason the two immediate neighbours with territorial disputes should not have similar instruments.

Perhaps the boldest step might be to establish buffer zones in the most dangerous areas along the LAC. Without prejudicing their respective positions on the boundary question, this is the most effective way to disengage and prevent conflict. Both sides agree they shall not follow or tail patrols of the other side in areas where there is no common understanding of the LAC.

Building buffer zones is a step further. And it is possible, too. From the mountains around Pangong Lake, a de facto buffer zone has already been established after the mutual withdrawal of troops.

It is ridiculous if, in the 21st century, Beijing and New Delhi are still hijacked by a dispute that is a colonial remnant, not least because apart from this dispute, they have no outstanding problems with each other.

Gone are the days when India said “Hindi Chini bhai bhai”, which means, in Hindi, “Indians and Chinese are brothers”. But China and India have every reason not to become foes. The border issue should not be a perennial curse. The two nuclear neighbours can ill-afford even a conventional war.

Senior Colonel Zhou Bo (ret) is a senior fellow at the Centre for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University and a China Forum expert

本文系观察者网独家稿件，文章内容纯属作者个人观点，不代表平台观点，未经授权，不得转载，否则将追究法律责任。关注观察者网微信guanchacn，每日阅读趣味文章。