【文/观察者网专栏作者 周波】

普京会对乌克兰使用核武器吗？这个至关重大的问题不仅与基辅和欧洲有关，也牵扯到中国。迄今，北京在其战略伙伴俄罗斯和重要贸易伙伴乌克兰之间精心维系着平衡。在9月的撒马尔罕峰会期间，普京对中国在乌克兰冲突中的“平衡立场”表示感谢。

但是，如果莫斯科决定对乌克兰使用战术核武器，中国将很难继续保持现在的立场。在2013年12月北京与基辅的联合声明中，中国表示不会对乌克兰使用或威胁使用核器，更为重要的是，在乌克兰面临来自第三方的此类威胁情况下，北京将提供安全保证。

因此，普京愈演愈烈的言辞无疑加重了北京的关切。他上月表态将准备“不惜一切代价”捍卫俄罗斯的“领土完整”。如果其军队在战场上挣扎——乌克兰军队正在收复哈尔科夫等地区，俄罗斯部署战术核导弹的可能性就会增加。

中国迄今未向俄罗斯提供任何军事援助。但鉴于北京对莫斯科的巨大影响，它可以在防止核冲突方面发挥自身的独特优势。

首先，北京应该告诉莫斯科遵守五个核大国于今年1月发表的联合声明：“核战争打不赢也打不得”。俄罗斯拥有世界上最大的核武库，当俄方威胁当年选择放弃核武器的乌克兰时，它已玷污了自己的声誉。如果普京坐实他对乌克兰人的威胁，那就更加骇人听闻。普京以前曾说过，乌克兰人与俄罗斯人“实际上是同一民族”。

第二，北京应该明确地告诉克里姆林宫，在战场上使用核武器将置中国于非常困难的境地。半个多世纪以来，北京一直奉行“不首先使用”核武器的政策。虽然其他国防政策已经调整，但这一点丝毫未变，中国以拥有最稳定、最可持续和最可预测的核战略而自豪。

北京现在最不想要的就是与欧洲各国关系恶化。在美国加紧与中国的竞争时，欧洲并非始终站在美国一边，这很重要。普京已经承认，北京对俄乌战争有“疑问和担忧”。如果他使用核武器，北京的反应将远远超出疑问和担忧。在全世界都对莫斯科表示抗议的情况下，中国是否还能保持中立？如果联合国安理会投票谴责俄罗斯的行径，北京还能弃权吗？

最后，北京可以在俄罗斯和北约谈判中发挥重要的调停作用。例如，北约可以承诺停止任何进一步的扩张，以换取莫斯科同意不使用核武器。这样的妥协能让双方都保住面子。在1962年古巴导弹危机期间，美国总统肯尼迪和苏联领导人赫鲁晓夫达成了类似的协议：苏联将拆除其在古巴部署的弹道导弹以换取美国不再入侵古巴的承诺。私下里，美国还同意拆除所有部署在土耳其可能用于对付俄罗斯的中程弹道导弹。

鉴于莫斯科的首要关切是北约扩张，普京可能认为这个选择值得考虑。这个选择也值得北约考虑。北约不顾克里姆林宫的警告执意东扩，已经将欧洲推向核冲突的边缘。普京说得对，这是俄罗斯与西方之间的战争，而不是俄罗斯和乌克兰之间的战争。出于诚意，北约可以表态承诺不首先对俄罗斯或在莫斯科的势力范围内使用核武器。

在一部2018年的纪录片中，普京问道：“没有俄罗斯，要世界干什么？”回答应该是，“如果没有世界，俄罗斯又在哪里？”如果普京现在打开一个即使在冷战时也一直关闭的核潘多拉魔盒，那堪称愚蠢之极。中国可以帮助世界，只需告诉普京：“总统先生，不要使用核武器！”

翻译：中国论坛 宋忆宁

核译：许馨匀 韩桦

英文原文：

Zhou Bo: China can use its leverage with Russia to prevent a nuclear war

Will Putin use nuclear weapons in Ukraine? This billion-dollar question matters not only to Kyiv and Europe, but also to China. So far Beijing has trodden a careful line between Russia, its strategic partner, and Ukraine, which is a significant trading partner. During September’s Samarkand summit, Vladimir Putin thanked China for its “balanced position” on the Ukraine conflict.

But if Moscow decides to use tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine, China can hardly maintain such a position anymore. A joint declaration between Beijing and Kyiv in December 2013 agreed that China will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against Ukraine and, more importantly, will provide security assurances in the event of any such threat by a third party.

Putin’s intensifying rhetoric is therefore raising the stakes for Beijing. He said last month he would be ready to defend the “territorial integrity” of Russia “by all means.” If his military is struggling on the battlefield — which it is in areas such as Kharkiv, where Ukrainian forces are retaking lost territory — then the likelihood of Russia deploying tactical nuclear missiles only increases.

China has so far refrained from providing any military assistance to Russia. But given Beijing’s huge influence on Moscow, it is uniquely positioned to do more to prevent a nuclear conflict.

First, Beijing should tell Moscow to honour the five nuclear powers’ joint statement in January that “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought”. Russia has the largest nuclear arsenal in the world and threatening Ukraine — which chose to give up its nuclear weapons — has already tarnished its reputation. It would be all the more appalling if Putin followed through on his threat against Ukrainian citizens, who he had previously described as “practically one people” with Russians.

Second, Beijing should make clear to the Kremlin that using nuclear weapons on the battlefield would put China in a very difficult situation. Beijing has maintained a policy of “no first use” of nuclear weapons for more than half a century. While other defence policies have changed, this has held firm and China prides itself on having nuclear strategies which are the most stable, sustainable and predictable among nuclear powers.

The last thing Beijing wants now is a sour relationship with European capitals. At a time when the US is ramping up its competition with China, it is particularly important that Europe does not always take America’s side. Putin has admitted that Beijing had “questions and concerns” about Russia’s invasion — but if he uses nuclear weapons, then Beijing’s response will go far beyond questions and concerns. Could China remain neutral in the event of international protests against Moscow? And could Beijing abstain from a UN Security Council vote condemning Russia for its actions?

Finally, Beijing could play a significant role in brokering a deal between Russia and Nato. For example, Nato could promise to halt any further expansion in exchange for Moscow agreeing not to use nuclear weapons. Such a compromise would save face on both sides. During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, US President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev reached a similar agreement: the Soviets would dismantle their ballistic missiles in Cuba in exchange for a US pledge not to invade Cuba again. Secretly, America also agreed to dismantle all of the Jupiter medium-range ballistic missiles which had been stationed in Turkey for possible use against Russia.

Since Moscow’s primary concern has been Nato expansion, Putin might find this option worth considering. It would be worth thinking about for Nato too. The alliance’s expansion in the face of the Kremlin’s warnings has helped push Europe to the brink of a nuclear conflict. Putin is right to conclude this is a war between Russia and the west rather than between Russia and Ukraine. As a goodwill gesture, Nato could pledge not to use nuclear weapons first against Russia or within Moscow’s sphere of influence.

In a 2018 documentary, Putin asked, “Why do we need a world without Russia in it?” The answer should be, “But where is Russia without the world?” If Putin now opens a nuclear Pandora’s box that was kept closed even during the cold war, it would be a moment of infinite stupidity. China can help the world by simply telling Putin: don’t use nuclear weapons, Mr President.

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