【文/程静、许竞之】

当地时间7月21日，美国国务院在一份公开声明中宣布，正在亚洲访问的美国常务副国务卿温迪·舍曼（Wendy Sherman），将于7月25日至26日访问中国。

在此之前，美国已在多个场合发出信号，暗示美中两国将进行高层接触。白宫印太事务协调员库尔特·坎贝尔（Kurt Campbell）在与美国亚洲社会政策研究所的对话会中表示期待美国总统拜登与中国国家主席习近平会晤，美国国家安全顾问沙利文（Jake Sullivan）也建议拜登在G20峰会期间与习近平会晤。然而，中方对此持谨慎态度，都未予以肯定。

“我们当然希望恢复对话，但这要看美国有没有诚意，”中国外交部长王毅在近日北京举行的第九届世界和平论坛（World Peace Forum）开幕式后被问及“中美高层今年会不会有接触”时表示。

王毅强调，当前中方最重要的是继续办好自己的事情。这一态度也得到了中国外交部官员的响应。

一些人认为中方的谨慎态度主要出于文化和心理上的原因。东方文化对于维护面子和声誉更为敏感，所以普遍认为双方都应该为高层交流营造友好环境，甚至是可以刻意为之。

因此，美国在三月份阿拉斯加中美会晤之前宣布对中国和香港官员实施制裁，而且时机选择在双方会晤之前，这一举措在许多中国人看来本身就是一种羞辱，绝非双方会晤前应有的友好序幕。

而此次在舍曼访华计划之前，美国发布了一份针对美资在港经营风险的“香港商业警告”，并无端制裁了中央政府驻香港联络部的七名官员。这再次发出了敌意讯号。

7月19日，英国《金融时报》报道称，拥有1400家会员企业的香港美国商会表示，拜登政府此举让他们的生存更加困难了。（《金融时报》报道截图）

笔者认为，文化心理因素只是表面现象，我们需要更为关注的是复杂的战略和地缘政治因素。

为何中方对美国的外交诚意表示怀疑？美方多次表示期待中美高层会晤真的是想解决双边或重大国际问题吗？我们可以从阿拉斯加的安克雷奇会谈得到一些答案。

显然，安克雷奇会谈表明，美国并无诚意与中国解决双边问题，比如在抗击新冠肺炎疫情中加强与中国合作、共同应对全球性挑战，而是完全为了一味寻求安抚和迎合美国国内民众。

因而，这场外交会唔成了拜登政府面对美国公众（包括共和党人）对华强硬立场的秀场。美国通过这场会晤向其国内民众传达的意味和信号非常清晰，即美国的意图是通过安克雷奇会晤在人权问题上给中国人上一课，根本不是为了改善双边关系。

值得注意的是，舍曼此次访华的时机及战略意图同样也暴露了拜登政府与中国接触缺乏诚意。

按照惯例，美国新一届政府的第一波次国事访问会安排重要盟国。上个月，七国集团峰会在意大利举行，拜登政府开展了在欧洲的联盟活动。

拜登与英国、日本和韩国等盟国领导人举行了面对面会谈。由于美国视中国为竞争对手，中国自然不在会见名单上。

然而，美俄之间的紧张关系却并没有妨碍拜登在第三国会见俄罗斯总统普京。即使在冷战最激烈的时候，至少为了控制危机，美国和苏联仍然保持着接触。

美国总统拜登（左二）会见俄罗斯总统普京（右二）（图源：路透社）

因此，舍曼在亚洲之行中将顺便访问中国表明，这个行程与其说是必要的，不如说是仅仅是一种外交姿态，我们很难不怀疑这是否又会成为美国高官对其国内民众的秀场。如果上课都上到中国来了，中国显然不会吃这一套，会坚决奉陪到底。

美国对华接触背后的战略意图至关重要。在美国国内，拜登政府发表的任何政策立场都会以遏制中国为背景战略，充分继承了特朗普政府的“全政府（whole-of-government）”对华遏制策略。在国际上，无论是在双边还是多边场合，美国都把中国问题作为与所有盟国和伙伴讨论的中心议题，敦促这些国家在人权、经济、高科技和军事问题上对华采取更强硬的立场。美国还在G7峰会上提出一项新的全球基础设施计划——“重建更美好世界”（Build Back Better World），欲与中国的“一带一路”抗衡。

美国这些举措都是为了在与中国的竞争中保持更好的战略位势。然而，从美国的做法可以明显看出，这个国家的战略并不是着力于发展自己从而为本国人民和国际社会创造和平与繁荣，而是想方设法调动国内和国际资源来遏制另一个国家。美国的战略目标并非发展自己，而是与中国竞争。

更令人失望的是，在抗击新冠肺炎疫情和恢复经济成为世界人权优先事项之时，在国际合作比以往任何时候都迫切之际，美国却在动用一切手段资源在所有领域推行大国竞争，把所有国家绑架在中美大国竞争的战车上，而且这个竞争是美国出于国内议程设置强加给中国的。

特别是，无论愿意与否，几乎每个国家都面临着不得不选边站的困境。在美国推动其他国家选择立场时，针对中国的虚假信息、制裁和胁迫已成为美国政策的“新常态”。

当外交会晤被美国用于战略对抗，中国的谨慎态度也就完全可以理解了，中国的谨慎态度也应该对亚太地区其他国家有所警示。

拜登在慕尼黑安全会议上重申美国对跨大西洋联盟的承诺，并称民主正受到攻击。（图源：金融时报）

拜登政府大声宣称“美国回来了”，这同时意味着美国将重返亚太。然而，回想一下美国通过朝鲜战争、越南战争和阿富汗战争对该地区造成的灾难性破坏，我们到底能否相信美国所吹嘘的对于亚太局势的稳定作用？对此，我们需要打一个大大的问号。

（英文版原文发表于《南华早报》）

As the No 2 US diplomat Wendy Sherman kicks off her Asian trip this week, no one has completely ruled out the possibility that she will visit China.

Even before her trip, signals were sent out on several occasions hinting at a high-level engagement between the United States and China. However, whether it is White House Indo-Pacific coordinator Kurt Campbell’s expectations of a meeting between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping, or US national security adviser Jake Sullivan’s suggestion of a Biden-Xi meeting on the sidelines of the G20 summit, China has yet to say yes.

“Of course we hope to resume dialogue, but it depends on whether the US is sincere,” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said at the World Peace Forum in Beijing, when asked whether there would be a high-level meeting between China and the US this year.

Wang stressed that the most important thing for China now is to continue to handle its own affairs well. Wang’s attitude was also echoed by officials for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Many have cited cultural and psychological reasons as explanations for China’s reservations. As oriental culture is more sensitive about maintaining reputations and saving face, high-level engagements should be conducted in a friendly environment that may have been specifically created.

So, in the eyes of many Chinese people, when the US announced sanctions on Chinese and Hong Kong officials just before the Alaska talks in March, it was a humiliation and far from a friendly curtain-raiser.

This time, ahead of Sherman’s possible visit to China, the US issued a “business advisory” about the risks of operating in Hong Kong and sanctioned seven officials from the central government’s liaison office in Hong Kong – once again sounding an ominous note.

Having said that, behind such cultural and psychological factors are complicated strategic and geopolitical reasons that should be explored.

Why does China remain doubtful about American sincerity? And, what lies behind the US’ expressions of interest in meeting Chinese leaders? To answer these questions, some lessons could be drawn from the meeting in Anchorage, Alaska.

As clearly manifested in the Anchorage talks, the US does not engage with China with the sincere intention to deal with bilateral issues, such as enhancing cooperation or tackling global challenges together in the time of Covid-19. Rather, the US seeks first to appease its domestic audience.

A diplomatic meeting was turned into a showcase for the Biden administration’s tough policy towards China before the American public, including the Republicans. This is a clear signal that the US-China engagement in Anchorage was about teaching the Chinese a lesson on human rights issues, rather than improving bilateral relations.

As the No 2 US diplomat Wendy Sherman kicks off her Asian trip this week, no one has completely ruled out the possibility that she will visit China.

Even before her trip, signals were sent out on several occasions hinting at a high-level engagement between the United States and China. However, whether it is White House Indo-Pacific coordinator Kurt Campbell’s expectations of a meeting between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping, or US national security adviser Jake Sullivan’s suggestion of a Biden-Xi meeting on the sidelines of the G20 summit, China has yet to say yes.

“Of course we hope to resume dialogue, but it depends on whether the US is sincere,” Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said at the World Peace Forum in Beijing, when asked whether there would be a high-level meeting between China and the US this year.

Wang stressed that the most important thing for China now is to continue to handle its own affairs well. Wang’s attitude was also echoed by officials for China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Many have cited cultural and psychological reasons as explanations for China’s reservations. As oriental culture is more sensitive about maintaining reputations and saving face, high-level engagements should be conducted in a friendly environment that may have been specifically created.

So, in the eyes of many Chinese people, when the US announced sanctions on Chinese and Hong Kong officials just before the Alaska talks in March, it was a humiliation and far from a friendly curtain-raiser.

This time, ahead of Sherman’s possible visit to China, the US issued a “business advisory” about the risks of operating in Hong Kong and sanctioned seven officials from the central government’s liaison office in Hong Kong – once again sounding an ominous note.

Having said that, behind such cultural and psychological factors are complicated strategic and geopolitical reasons that should be explored.

Why does China remain doubtful about American sincerity? And, what lies behind the US’ expressions of interest in meeting Chinese leaders? To answer these questions, some lessons could be drawn from the meeting in Anchorage, Alaska.

As clearly manifested in the Anchorage talks, the US does not engage with China with the sincere intention to deal with bilateral issues, such as enhancing cooperation or tackling global challenges together in the time of Covid-19. Rather, the US seeks first to appease its domestic audience.

A diplomatic meeting was turned into a showcase for the Biden administration’s tough policy towards China before the American public, including the Republicans. This is a clear signal that the US-China engagement in Anchorage was about teaching the Chinese a lesson on human rights issues, rather than improving bilateral relations.

Notably, the timing of Sherman’s possible visit and its strategic intentions give the lie to the seriousness of the Biden administration’s intentions to engage China.

It is customary for a new US administration’s first state visits to be to allied countries. Biden has just finished his alliance campaign in Europe, where he attended the G7 summit last month.

He has held face-to-face meetings with leaders of allied countries including Britain, Japan and South Korea. Since the US views China as a rival, it’s natural that it is not on that list.

However, the strained relationship between the US and Russia has not prevented Biden from meeting President Vladimir Putin in a third country.

Even at the height of the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union remained engaged with each other to at least manage the crisis. Thus, Sherman’s by-the-way visit to China speaks for itself. This is an itinerary detail that’s more optional than essential.

Finally, it is the strategic intention behind the US engagement with China that plays the most important role in defining the relationship between the two. Domestically, the Biden administration has seldom delivered policy positions without the containment of China serving as a backdrop.

Internationally, the China issue has been put forward by the US as a central topic to be discussed with all its allies and partners on either bilateral or multilateral occasions.

The US has urged these nations to take a harder line on Beijing’s human rights problem, economic practices, hi-tech development and military issues. A new global infrastructure programme, “Build Back Better World”, has been purposely adopted to rival China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

All these efforts are aimed at better positioning the US in its competition with China. US practices give the distinct impression that the nation is not developing itself to deliver peace and prosperity to its people and the international community. Instead, it is mobilising its domestic and international resources to contain another state. Its strategic goal is not to develop itself but to compete with another nation.

Worse, at a time when fighting the Covid-19 pandemic and restoring the economy are top human rights priorities for the world, and international cooperation is more necessary than ever, the US has used every lever it has to push big-power competition.

The dilemma of having to choose a side has been thrust upon nearly every state, like it or not. Disinformation, sanctions and coercion with regard to China have become the “new normal” as the US pushes others to take sides.

When diplomatic engagement is applied in a strategic confrontation, it is no wonder that China is being cautious. Chinese wariness should also serve as a warning to other countries in this region.

When the Biden administration loudly declares that the US is back, it also means that America is back in the Asia-Pacific. However, given the devastation of the Korean, Afghanistan and Vietnam wars, the real question is how much the US can be trusted to deliver on its boast that it plays a stabilising role in the region.

Dr Cheng Jing is an associate fellow at the Global Governance Institution and lecturer at the School of Foreign Studies, Xidian University

Xu Jingzhi is an intern at the Global Governance Institution. She studies at New York University Shanghai, majoring in political science and economics

（https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3141792/will-xi-meet-biden-why-china-wary-us-diplomatic-intentions）