【文/翟崑】

中国和美国正在加紧努力，以获得在东南亚的影响力。随着竞争升温，印度尼西亚正成为两国外交的主要目标。

东盟于2019年发布了东盟印太展望，展望旨在搭建地区的合作框架。美国总统拜登和中国国家主席习近平均接受了这一展望，后者强调通过“一带一路”倡议开展合作。

拜登显然重视东南亚。在他上任的第一年，他已经派出副总统、国务卿和国防部长访问东盟各国。拜登本人去年10月通过视频连线出席了东亚峰会。

国务卿安东尼·布林肯最近一次访问该地区始于12月出访雅加达，凸显出美国对这一不结盟新兴大国的魅力攻势。

这位美国领导人的努力应该得到高度肯定；并不是每一位总统都如此关注这个地区。奥巴马政府的“重返亚洲”提升了美国在该地区的领导力，但在特朗普任期内美国缺乏后续行动，导致其全球影响力普遍下降。

现在的问题是，拜登的努力是否足以重振美国在东南亚的领导力。

美国正在迎头赶上。它寻求降低中国在东南亚的影响力，但中国有许多工具可以用来保持其在该地区的优势，主要是通过“一带一路”倡议提供的经济和基础设施支持。

在上个月与印尼总统佐科·维多多的通话中，习近平呼吁两国将“一带一路”合作纳入各自的发展目标，并承诺中国将全力支持印尼的发展和深化合作。

过去一年，中国还积极推动与东盟的关系。外交部长王毅自2020年10月以来访问了全部10个东盟国家。2021年，中国巩固了地区合作基础，为未来合作提供了新动力。

去年9月10日，越南副总理范平明(右)在河内会见来访的中国外交部长王毅之前行碰肘礼。在一年的时间里，王访问了东盟十国。图片：越南通讯社/法新社

第一，自2020年以来，双方已成为彼此最大的贸易伙伴，共同于2022年1月1日实施的区域全面经济伙伴关系协定，并将致力于中国-东盟自由贸易区升级。

2021年连接中国和老挝的高速铁路既是中国-东盟关系和“一带一路”倡议的亮点，也对老挝这一渴望发展的内陆国家具有重大意义。

第二，在安全方面，南海被普遍视为中国与东南亚关系中的一根刺。然而，在《中国-东盟南海各方行为宣言》于2002年签署后，为敲定行为准则的工作正在开展。到目前为止，双方已经成功地控制分歧，没有发生军事冲突。

第三，在与东盟的全面合作方面，目前的重点是促进经济发展和共同应对疫情。去年11月，中国将与东盟的关系从战略伙伴关系升级到全面战略伙伴关系。

一列火车在隧道内穿越中老边境。长达1035公里的中老高铁于2021年12月开通运营，是2021年中国-东盟关系的一大亮点。图片：新华社

与此同时，拜登在东南亚的印太战略有三个主要组成部分：安全、政治和经济——最后一个是其最薄弱的环节。

美国加强了四边安全对话中与澳大利亚、印度和日本的合作，建立了AUKUS加强与英国和澳大利亚的联盟。但到目前为止，它已经将自己排除在亚洲两大自由贸易协定之外。

拜登承诺要创造一个印太经济框架，深化美国在该地区的贸易和投资。但就东盟国家而言，行动将胜于语言。现在判断拜登任期内美国领导力的恢复还为时过早。

印尼是东盟人口最多的国家，也是G20成员国，在东南亚有相当大的影响力。中国高度重视印度尼西亚，已成为该国最大的投资者之一。中国花费数十亿美元建设新的高速公路、发电厂和机场，以及雅万高铁。印尼大约80%的新冠疫苗来自中国。

1月27日，在印度尼西亚唐格朗的一所小学，一名学生接种了科兴生物疫苗，该计划面向6至11岁的儿童提供疫苗接种。图片：欧洲新闻摄影社

关键问题是印尼会否在中美之间选边站。毫无疑问，它更希望与北京和华盛顿建立互惠关系，维持和平与稳定。那么印尼在东盟的展望中能扮演什么角色呢？

首先，它必须与时俱进，顺应形势变化，兼顾中美两国的需要。如果大国想要赢得该地区的支持，它们必须超越私利和大国竞争。印尼必须坚持自己的外交政策道路，将大国竞争的势能引向对东盟的强化。

其次，它应该找到需要加强协作的领域，并将其纳入制度化的合作体系。例如，最近发布的《东盟-中国关于加强绿色和可持续发展合作的联合声明》可以成为实现东盟“一个共同发展和繁荣的印太地区”这一愿景的渠道。

同样，东盟和美国国际开发署于2020年签署的《区域发展合作协定》也将发挥作用。

中美在东南亚的良性竞争可加强东盟印太展望框架下的国际发展合作。大国竞争不仅会给东盟成员国带来巨大利益，也会给整个地区带来巨大利益。

（原文刊登于南华早报，2022年2月4日）

How Indonesia and the rest of Asean can benefit from US-China competition

zhai kun

China and the United States are ramping up their efforts to gain influence in Southeast Asia. As the competition hots up, Indonesia is emerging as a prime target of their diplomacy.

Asean released its Outlook on the Indo-Pacific statement in 2019 that is intended to serve as a framework for cooperation in the region. While US President Joe Biden has embraced this vision, Chinese President Xi Jinping has stressed cooperation through the Belt and Road Initiative.

Biden clearly attaches great importance to Southeast Asia. In his first year in office, he has already sent his vice-president, secretary of state and secretary of defence to various Association of Southeast Asian Nation countries. Biden himself attended the East Asia Summit last October via video link.

The most recent trip to the region, by Secretary of State Antony Blinken in December, started in Jakarta, underlining the US charm offensive towards this non-aligned emerging power.

The US leader deserves high marks for his efforts; not every president has paid as much attention to this region. The Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” boosted US leadership in the region, but a lack of follow-through during Donald Trump’s term saw it decline amid a general slump in America’s global influence.

The question now is whether Biden’s efforts will be enough to re-energise American leadership in Southeast Asia.

The US is playing catch-up. It seeks to reduce China’s influence in Southeast Asia, but China has many tools to use to maintain its advantage in the region, primarily its economic and infrastructure support through the Belt and Road Initiative.

In his phone conversation with Indonesian President Joko Widodo last month, Xi called on both countries to integrate their belt and road cooperation into their development goals, and pledged China’s full support to promote Indonesia’s development and deepen cooperation.

China has also actively promoted relations with Asean this past year. Foreign Minister Wang Yi has visited all 10 Asean countries since October 2020. In 2021, China consolidated the basis for cooperation in the region and provided new impetus for future collaboration.

First, the two sides have become each other’s largest trading partner since 2020. They jointly prepared for the implementation of Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership on January 1, and will work on an upgrade of the China-Asean Free Trade Area.

This year, the high-speed railway linking China and Laos is not only the highlight of China-Asean relations and the Belt and Road Initiative, it also carries great significance for Laos, a landlocked country hungry for development.

Second, in terms of security, it is generally believed that the South China Sea is a thorn in the relationship between China and Southeast Asia. However, after the China-Asean Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was signed in 2002, work is ongoing to finalise a code of conduct and so far the parties have successfully controlled their differences without military conflict.

Third, in terms of overall cooperation with Asean, the current focus is on promoting economic development and dealing jointly with the pandemic. Last November, China upgraded its relations with Asean from a strategic partnership to a comprehensive strategic partnership.

Meanwhile, Biden’s Indo-Pacific strategy in Southeast Asia has three main components: security, political and economic – the last being its weakest link.

The US has strengthened the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue with its Quad partners Australia, India and Japan, and established the Aukus alliance with Britain and Australia. But so far it has excluded itself from two major free trade agreements in Asia.

Biden has pledged to create an Indo-Pacific economic framework that will deepen US trade and investment in the region. But where Asean countries are concerned, actions will speak louder than words. It is still too early to judge the recovery of US leadership during Biden’s term.

Indonesia, Asean’s most populous country and a member of the G20, has considerable influence in Southeast Asia. China assigns great importance to Indonesia and has become one of the largest investors in the country, spending billions of dollars on building new highways, power plants and the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway. About 80 per cent of Covid-19 vaccines in Indonesia come from China.

The key question is whether Indonesia will choose sides between China and the United States. No doubt, it would prefer relations with Beijing and Washington to be mutually beneficial and contribute towards peace and stability. So what role can Indonesia play in Asean’s outlook?

First, it must keep pace with the times, in light of the changing situation and taking account of the needs of both China and the US. And if major powers want to win support in the region, they must go beyond self-interest and big-power competition. Indonesia must maintain its own foreign policy path and direct the potential energy of major power competition into strengthening Asean.

Second, it should find where collaboration needs to be strengthened and incorporate it into institutionalised cooperation systems. For example, the recently released Asean-China Joint Statement on Enhancing Green and Sustainable Development Cooperation can become the channel for implementing Asean’s vision of “an Indo-Pacific region of development and prosperity for all”.

Similarly, the Regional Development Cooperation Agreement signed in 2020 between Asean and the United States Agency for International Development, will have a role to play.

A healthy rivalry between China and the US in Southeast Asia can strengthen international development cooperation under the framework of the Asean Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. Major-power competition could lead to great benefits, not only for Asean member states, but also for the whole region.