【文/经士智库总裁，中国论坛特约专家 田士臣；经士智库实习生 张博涵】

美国副国务卿舍曼在前阵子结束了对于中国的“顺道儿”访问，由于就会谈议题讨论激烈，直到最后一刻双方才就访问议程达成一致。值得注意的是，几乎是在同一时间，美国国防部长劳埃德·奥斯汀在五角大楼的新闻发布会上宣布了他对于美国东南亚诸盟友，即新加坡、越南、菲律宾的访问。

奥斯汀高调的亚洲之行旨在重申美国新政府作为“可靠伙伴”的承诺。在开启访问前的讲话中，他将此行目的地称为美国的“优先行动区域”，并表示此行的主要目标是加强“该地区强大的盟友和伙伴网络”。

此外，他表示，他将借此机会明确美国在挑战中国在南海“无益且毫无根据”的主张方面的立场。

奥斯汀近日在新加坡的讲话中，也传达了类似的关键信息。

7月27日，来访的美国国防部长劳埃德奥斯汀和新加坡国防部长黄永亨在新加坡国防部检阅仪仗队。（图源：美联社）

为了增强盟国对美国军事承诺的信心，奥斯汀试图展示美国的军事实力: 在飞往亚洲之前，他参观了阿拉斯加的艾尔森空军基地。在那里，他在三架美国F-35闪电II型飞机前发表了演讲。

美国近期的种种迹象表明其正在尝试推动在印太地区的军事行动力，以应对所谓的中国威胁。甚至几天前，在印度太平洋地区有丰富工作经验的潜艇指挥官迈克尔·拉基特（Michael Luckett）上校接任了关岛海军司令部司令一职。

与此同时，总部位于华盛顿的智库新美国安全中心（Centre for a New American Security） 表示，美国似乎正朝着“全方位竞争”（full spectrum competition）战略迈进，为可能发生的大国冲突做准备。

所有这些新的动向似乎都与近期拜登“美国回来了”的誓言相一致。但美国真的能像二战后那样回到亚太地区吗? 这个问题引发的争论恐怕要比答案更多。

奥斯汀表示，“我们相信我们是一支稳定的力量; 无论我们在哪里，在世界的哪个地方，我们都为该地区的稳定增加了价值。”然而，在他发表这些漂亮的官方声明的同时，美国和北约在阿富汗的撤军，也正在造成巨大的混乱。

在阿富汗，以美国为首的“反恐战争” 摧毁了成千上万的平民和军人的生活, 但国家的和平与稳定的前景依然暗淡。经过近20年的战争, 人们不禁思考：美国真的导致了该地区的稳定么？

人们也不该忘记越南和朝鲜半岛。位于这两个地方的朝鲜战争和越南战争是一场人道主义灾难，那些炮火的的阴霾至今仍在人们的心中——尤其是那些因敌对行动而沦为难民的越南人，以及因战争而离散的朝鲜家庭。

试想如果奥斯丁在访问越南时称赞美国在越南扮演了“维稳”的角色，那将会多么的荒诞。

在新加坡，奥斯汀郑重承诺，美国将建立使各国能够自行做出决定的伙伴关系。而在漂亮的诺言背后，对于美国否能信守承诺的质疑声也接连不断。

以史为镜，我们不难发现，亚太地区有一个长期存在的共识，即该地区的经济增长依赖中国的发展，而安全方面则依赖美国。但随着中国经济增长成为世界第二大经济体，其日益增长的全球影响力不可避免地挑战了美国对亚洲盟友安全承诺的基础，即二战后建立的同盟体系。

过去几十年，中国巨大的市场和丰富的经济机会吸引了无数的亚洲国家前来进行经贸往来，并与中国建立战略伙伴关系。到现在，那些从中国崛起中受到恩惠的亚洲小国开始发现，自己比以往任何时候都更加依赖中国。

在大国竞争的背景下，同时实现亚地区的安全保护和经济发展越来越成为悖论，这对亚洲国家而言已经变成了一个两难的选择。随着美国拜登政府延续特朗普政府强加给中国的美国鹰派政策，这种局面被进一步复杂化了。

可是，当奥斯丁誓言要加强美国的盟友和伙伴网络时，这明摆着就是在要求这些盟友和伙伴在中美之间选择立场，就像美国在欧洲所做的那样。如果这种立场是被迫选边站队的结果，亚洲国家怎么可能像奥斯丁承诺的那样可以行使自己做主的主权权利呢?

中国巨大的市场和丰富的经济机会对其他亚洲国家具有很大的吸引力。（图源：美联社）

最后，没有人知道拜登政府的回到亚洲的政策会持续多久。实际上在2012年， 时任美国总统的奥巴马就宣布了美国要“重返亚洲”(pivot to Asia)的战略，旨在重建美国的领导地位。然而，奥巴马的努力很快就被他的继任者特朗普总统破坏了。特朗普倾向于单边决定，并放弃了美国与亚洲的许多伙伴关系。

美国引以为傲的民主制度下政府随党派选举结果自由更迭，恰恰给包括亚洲国家在内的整个国际社会带来了巨大的不确定性。疫情当前，抗击新冠肺炎和恢复经济是世界的当务之急，国际合作比以往任何时候都更有必要。然而，美国忽略了合作的重要战略性意义，而动用了它所能动用的一切手段——包括以合作为名，来推动大国之间的竞争。

当它在亚洲的盟友和伙伴网络也被用来推动大国竞争时，不得不站队的两难境地将被强加到几乎每个国家身上，不管它们喜不喜欢。我们能在多大程度上相信美国会兑现其在该地区发挥稳定作用的承诺?  这是个值得令人深思的问题。

（英文原文见下页）

How the US uses its Asian allies in great-power competition with China | South China Morning Post

As US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman wrapped up her by-the-way visit to China – the subject of intense negotiation, with the two countries unable to agree on the proposed engagement until the very last minute – US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin kicked off his visit to America’s allies in Southeast Asia, namely Singapore, Vietnam and the Philippines.

Austin’s high-profile visit to Asia aims to reaffirm the new administration’s commitment as “a reliable partner”. In remarks before the trip, Austin referred to these destinations as America’s “priority theatre of operations” and said the major goal of his visit was to strengthen the “powerful network of allies and partners in the region”.

Further, he said, he would take the opportunity to make clear the US stance on challenging what he called “unhelpful and unfounded” claims by China in the South China Sea.

His key message was echoed in his speech in Singapore.

To boost allies’ confidence in America’s military commitment, Austin showcased America’s military muscles: before flying to Asia he visited Alaska’s Eielson Air Force Base, where he made a speech against the backdrop of three F-35 Lightning II aircraft.

In fact, the US is pushing to boost its military presence in the Indo-Pacific to counter the alleged China threat. A few days ago, Captain Michael Luckett, a submarine commander with experience in the Indo-Pacific, took over command of the Guam Naval Command.

Meanwhile, according to the Centre for a New American Security, a Washington-based think tank, the US appears to be moving towards a strategy of “full spectrum competition” in preparation for a possible great-power conflict.

All of the above is consistent with a single message that corresponds to US President Joe Biden’s declaration that “America is back”. But could the US really be back in the Asia-Pacific as it used to be after World War II? Asking this brings more questions than answers.

“We believe that we’re a stabilising force; no matter where we are, what part of the world, we add value to the stability of the region,” said Austin. But while he was making these beautiful official statements, the drawdown of American and Nato forces in Afghanistan is causing chaos.

Hundreds of thousands of civilian and military lives have been lost in the US-led “war on terror” in Afghanistan, yet the prospects for peace and stability in the country remain dim. After nearly 20 years of war, one might ask how the US has contributed to the stability of that region.

And let’s not forget Vietnam and the Korean peninsula. The Korean war and the Vietnam war were humanitarian catastrophes and the aftermath of both wars is still being felt – not least by the Vietnamese who were made refugees by the hostilities and the Korean families parted by war.

It would be interesting to hear Austin extol America’s role as a “stabilising force” in Vietnam when he visits.

In Singapore, Austin pledged that the US would build partnerships that would allow countries to make their own decisions. This is doubtful.

There is a long-standing consensus in Asia and the Pacific that the region depended on China for economic growth and the US for security. But as China’s economy grew to be the world’s second-largest, its increasing global influence inevitably challenges the alliance system that forms the basis for America’s security commitment to its Asian allies.

China’s huge market and abundant economic opportunities are a big draw for other Asian countries. Smaller Asian nations that benefited from the prosperity brought by China’s boom now find themselves more dependent on China than ever before.

This security-versus-development dilemma is further complicated by big-power competition as the hawkish US policy that was imposed on China by the Trump administration is inherited by the Biden administration.

When Austin vows to strengthen America’s network of allies and partners, no one doubts that he is asking these allies and partners to choose sides, the same as the US has done in Europe. Forced to choose, how could these Asian countries exercise their sovereign right of making their own decisions, as Austin promised?

People walk past shops in Beijing on May 12. China’s huge market and abundant economic opportunities are a big draw for other Asian countries. Photo: AP

People walk past shops in Beijing on May 12. China’s huge market and abundant economic opportunities are a big draw for other Asian countries. Photo: AP

Last but not least, no one knows how long this policy of Biden’s administration may last. In 2012, then-US president Barack Obama announced America’s “pivot to Asia”, a doctrine aimed at rebuilding America’s leadership role. Obama’s efforts, however, were soon undermined by his successor, Donald Trump, who preferred unilateral decisions and abandoned many of America’s partnerships with Asia.

The change of government under the US democratic system brings huge uncertainty not only to Asian countries but also to the whole international community.

At a time when fighting the Covid-19 pandemic and restoring the economy are top priorities for the world, international cooperation is more necessary than ever. Yet the US has used every lever it has to push big-power competition.

When its Asian network of allies and partners is also being used to push big-power competition, the dilemma of having to choose a side will be thrust upon nearly every state, like it or not. How much can the US be trusted to deliver on its boast that it plays a stabilising role in the region? That’s the question.

Captain (Retired) Tian Shichen is founder and president of the Global Governance Institution and director of the Centre for International Law of Military Operations in Beijing. He is also a China Forum expert

Leon Zhang is an intern at the Global Governance Institution

（https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3142888/how-us-uses-its-asian-allies-great-power-competition-china）